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LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY 
Jeremiah A. Ho∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 
Our conceptions of law affect how we objectify the law and 
ultimately how we study it.  Despite a century’s worth of 
theoretical progress in American law—from legal realism to 
critical legal studies movements and postmodernism—the 
formalist conception of “law as science,” as promulgated by 
Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School in the late-
nineteenth century, continues to influence the inductive 
methodologies used today to impart knowledge in American legal 
education.  This lasting influence of the Langdellian scientific 
conception of law has persisted even as the present crisis in legal 
education has engendered other reforms.  However, subsequent 
movements of legal thought have revealed that the law is neither 
scientific nor “objective” in the way the Langdellian formalists 
once envisioned.  After all, the Langdellian scientific objectivity of 
law itself reflected the dominant class, gender, power, and race of 
its nineteenth-century progenitors.  Thus, by sustaining the 
illusion of scientific objectivity, the continued application of 
Langdellian pedagogy distorts our understandings of law and 
abridges individual explorations of pluralism, subjectivity, justice, 
and empowerment.  Such prevailing false notions of neutrality in 
law leads to both disenchantment and hierarchy in legal practice, 
but worse it also distracts from meanings of law that would 
otherwise have led to empowerment and critique.  In this way, 
legal scholars have clamored for a post-Langdellian legal 
conception to enable us to reach more relevant and emboldened 
meanings in law. 
Prompted by such calls amidst the post-Recession crisis in 
the American legal academy, this Article offers such a new 
conception for theorizing meanings in law by locating law within 
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its instrumentalities.  “Law as instrumentality” obtains meaning 
by accepting law’s fragmentation and then observing, from 
fragmentation, the characteristics of its agency.  The law is not a 
science; but it does embody human-made qualities of agency.  This 
new instrumentality conception studies law’s deliberate aesthetics 
as a way to explore law ontologically and critique its goals, its 
devices, its intentions, its significances, and its teleologies.  From 
this conception, a broader methodology can arise to bring about a 
more relevant and empowering understanding of law to those who 
render it to life.      
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For better or worse, examples demonstrating the age-old 
observation that lawyers are typically a pessimistic lot1 have 
reared themselves noticeably during this present crisis in 
American legal academy and education2—a period that has 
                                                 
1 See Martin E.P. Seligman, et. al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 33, 39-41 (2001) (characterizing lawyers as pessimistic and describing 
the causes of such pessimism in lawyers). 
2 See, e.g., Megan McArdle, The Perils of Law School: A Chat with Paul 
Campos, Author of DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL!, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 24, 
2012). In the interview, Campos states: “Yes indeed, but the waterline has now 
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drifted perilously on tides of the Great Recession.3  Observations 
based on popular psychology tend to avoid being completely 
truthful on a particular subject.4  Every once in a while, however, 
an observation reveals a beacon of truth.5  Not long after national 
enrollment amongst law schools began to decline and the outside 
world took notice with scrutiny in 2011,6 the word, “crisis,” was 
first uttered within the legal academy.7  From its initial nervous 
whisper, this utterance of crisis did not go unheard.8  At first, 
there were defensive stances of denial.9  Very shortly, 
nonetheless, the facade of denial gave way to reveal a deep sense 
of anxiety—the contagious kind that spreads rapidly amongst a 
                                                                                                                            
risen so high that large portions of the classes at top ten law schools are 
struggling, so now there’s a “crisis.”). 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/24/the-perils-of-law-school.html. 
3 Jordan Weissmann, What Do Lawyers and Bankers Have in Common? 
They Lost Jobs in 2011, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, (Jan. 10, 2012, 1:30 PM 
EST), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/what-do-lawyers-
and-bankers-have-incommon-they-lost-jobs-in-2011/251130/#. 
4 See Peter Brooks, Law, Therapy, Culture, 13 Yale J.L. & Human. 227, 237 
(2001) (discussing the Supreme Court’s substituting of “popular psychology” for 
“common sense” in a criminal decision as “rhetorical self-blinding”); see also 
Mary L. Tenopyra, A Scientist-Practitioner’s Viewpoint on the Admissibility of 
Behavioral and Social Scientific Information, 5 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 194, 
197 (1999) (maintaining that “popular psychology that obtains considerable 
publicity is often at odds with scientific psychology”). 
5 Kevin W. Saunders, The Framers, Children, and Free Expression, 25 
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 187, 235 (2011) (noting how academic 
psychology and popular psychology are something in accord). 
6 Jordan Weissmann, What Do Lawyers and Bankers Have in Common? 
They Lost Jobs in 2011, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, (Jan. 10, 2012, 1:30 PM 
EST). http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/what-do-lawyers-
and-bankers-have-incommon-they-lost-jobs-in-2011/251130/#. 
7 McArdle, supra note __.   
8 See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and the Competition in 
Legal Education:  A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal 
Profession and Legal Education, 24 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 503 (2013); Paul 
Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 177 
(2012).  
9 David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 
8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html (“But 
improbably enough, law schools have concluded that life for newly minted 
grads is getting sweeter. . . . How do law schools depict a feast amid so much 
famine?”).  
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group of pessimistic individuals.10  Once the anxiety set in, the 
halls of the American legal academy, as narrow as they are 
hallowed, served as an echo chamber, repeating and amplifying 
and ruminating over the notion of crisis until the noise became a 
collective cry of distress.11  Then not long after, distress 
crystallized into action by law school and university 
administrations and much of it was swift in a corporate sense:  
cut-backs on faculty scholarship monies,12 buy-outs,13 rebuke,14 
rumors of school closures,15 reduction in staff,16 and pull-backs on 
faculty hiring17 to name a few.  Simultaneously, a series of how-to 
reform legal education articles and books bombarded the 
                                                 
10 Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (July 14, 2012),  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-
existential-crisis-for-law-schools.html  (“Law schools have hustled to 
compensate for these shifts by trying to make it look as if their graduates are 
more marketable, even hiring them as research assistants to offer temporary 
employment.  But those strategies won’t fix legal education. . . .”).  
11 ABA Commission on the Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Profession 




12 Fabio Arcila Jr., The Future of Scholarship in Law Schools, 31 Touro L. 
Rev. 15, 19 (2014) (“In the past few years, these scholarship incentives have 
been reduced or withdrawn, a trend that is likely to continue into the 
foreseeable future.”). 
13 Mary Moore, New England Law offers Faculty Buyouts, Dean takes Pay 
Cut, BOSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2013/10/29/new-england-law-dean-
pay-buyout.html.  
14 See, e.g., Robin West, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE 
DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 17 (2014) (“[L]aw schools’ current business 
model is not only unsustainable but also immoral.”). 
15 Ashby Jones and Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment, Law Schools 
Are Cutting Faculty, THE WALL STREET J. (July 15, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873236642045786078102924332
72 (reporting law schools faculty lay-offs after “having trimmed staff”). 
16 Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Schools Cope with Declining Enrollment by 
Quietly Cutting Faculty, ABA J. (July 16, 2013) 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_schools_cope_with_declining_enro
llment_by_quietly_cutting_faculty. 
17 Law Schools Put Hiring Freeze on Faculty, NEW JERSEY BUSINESS (Oct. 
12, 2012) http://www.njbiz.com/article/20121012/NJBIZ01/121019932/law-
schools-put-hiring-freeze-on-faculty.  
2017]                   LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY                         5 
literature.18  A blame game began to surface from all directions.19  
On a day-to-day level at law schools, reports of pandemonium and 
fury, and long days and nights at the office were not uncommon.20  
In studying all of these events as part of classic pessimistic 
behavior, these responses should not surprise ourselves; in times 
of real or perceived crisis, pessimists (lawyers and law professors 
included) will often abandon ship, reach for a raft of security, and 
internalize obsessively about self-preservation—all the while 
hopefully searching for a new course.21      
At first, internalization from within the legal academy 
came most notably from Brian Tamanaha and his book, Failing 
Law Schools,22 which prominently attempted to explain the 
economic causes of the post-Recession law school crisis.23  
Although Tamanaha was not the only one critiquing law schools 
from a financial perspective,24 his work was arguably the most 
widely read and discussed.25  In Failing Law Schools, Tamanaha 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Farida Ali, Globalizing the U.S. Law School Curriculum: How 
Should Legal Educators Respond?, 41 Int’l J. Legal Info. 249 (2013); Beverly 
Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell: Innovating in Legal Education, 62 Cath. 
U. L. Rev. 643 (2013); Anthony V. Alfieri, Educating Lawyers for Community, 
2012 Wis. L. Rev. 115 (2012).   
19  See Paul Campos, Stop Blaming the Law School Bubble on the 2007 
Financial Crisis, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2013); Bruce Feldthusen, Legal 
Profession in Turmoil:  Let’s Blame the Law Schools, 
CANADIANLAWYERMAG.COM (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/4429/Legal-profession-in-turmoil-Lets-
blame-the-law-schools.html.   
20 Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost:  How Law Schools Disappoints Law 
Students, The Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 219, 
236 (2007) (“It should come as no surprise that the ABA committees that set 
law school standards are dominated by those who have succeeded and are 
comfortable in the current system: law school deans and professors.”). 
21 See F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit (1988). 
22 Brian Z. Tamanaha, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).  
23 See generally id. 
24 See e.g., PAUL CAMPOS, DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL (UNLESS):  A LAW 
PROFESSOR’S GUIDE TO MAXIMIZING OPPORTUNITY AND MINIMIZING RISK (2012); 
Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 177 (2012). 
25 See generally David Burk, Book Review, 63 J.L. EDUCATION 349 (2013); 
Charles Lane, Book Review: ‘Failing Law Schools’ by Brian Z. Tamanaha¸THE 
WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2012). https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-
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argued that the post-Recession law school crisis had essentially 
two culprits.  First, law school tuitions had surpassed inflation to 
amounts that heavily burdened students with outstanding debt 
upon graduation.26  He culled through much empirical data to 
demonstrate the phenomena of this debt-to-inflation ratio.27  But 
even as he cites an anecdotal example by comparing different 
generations of law students, his point was rather illustrative:  
Law students in the seventies and early eighties who 
worked at corporate law firms during the summer 
could earn enough to cover the following year’s 
tuition and perhaps some living expenses.  This 
helped keep down the level of debt.  Despite the 
dramatic increase in staring associate pay at 
corporate law firms that occurred in the early 2000s, 
the best-paying summer jobs today, which few 
students land, generate enough income for a student 
to pay half, at most, of one year’s tuition at a top 
school.28  
Such debt-to-inflation ratios, Tamanaha observed, would impede 
upon new law school graduates’ options as they move into their 
careers.29  Money, after all, gives one options in employment and 
life-style.  But he was not finished yet; another casual reason for 
the crisis, Tamanaha observed, was that post-graduation 
employment levels at law schools were in jeopardy.30  The 
shrunken post-2008 legal job market was not able to allow the 
adequate match between the number of attorney jobs available 
and the number of new graduates that law schools were 
producing.31  According to Tamanaha, instead of reducing the size 
of classes, “[l]aw schools responded to this abysmal job 
environment by increasing the number of students they enrolled 
                                                                                                                            
review-failing-law-schools-by-brian-z-tamanaha/2012/08/03/e7054c9c-c6df-
11e1-916d a4bc61efcad8_story.html?utm_term=.9a436e554f0b.    
26 See Tamanaha, supra note __, at 136-40. 
27 See id.  
28 Id. at 109. 
29 See e.g. id at 111-12 (citing an example with a law student named 
“Sarah”). 
30 Id. at 145-60. 
31 Id.  
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in 2009, and yet again in 2010—thereby promising to throw out 
even more law graduates onto the saturated employment pool 
three years hence.”32  Of course, he was not the sole voice to make 
these inspections on law school business practices.  Critics, both 
within legal education and beyond, similarly targeted the 
economics of law schools during this era of crisis.33       
 This opportunity for deep internalization in legal 
education, led by Tamanaha’s book, also prompted and stoked 
critiques of other aspects of legal education, particularly in the 
effects that recent cultural and generational shifts in law 
students have had on law schools and professionalism,34 and also 
on the uses of new technology in law teaching.35  At first, the 
discussion of cultural and curricular reform in law schools—
particularly ones that resembled the Carnegie Report,36 
MacCrate,37 and Best Practices38—going into the Great Recession 
were sidelined briefly for a time, perhaps as the academy’s 
attention was honing in on too-big-to-fail characterizations of law 
school business and marketing practices rather than pedagogical 
reforms.39  But as interest in the economic narratives of law 
                                                 
32 Id. at 167.   
33 See generally Steven J. Harper, THE LAWYER BUBBLE (2013); William D. 
Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 461 (2013); Paul Campos, 
DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL (UNLESS): A LAW PROFESSOR’S INSIDE GUIDE TO 
MAXIMIZING OPPORTUNITY AND MINIMIZING RISK (2012). 
34 Emily A. Benfer & Colleen F. Shanahan, Educating the Invincibles:  
Strategies for Teaching the Millennial Generation in Law School, 20 NYU 
Clinical L. Rev. 1 (2013); Susan Swaim Daicoff, Expanding the Lawyer’s 
Toolkit of Skills and Competencies: Synthesizing Leadership, Professionalism, 
Emotional Intelligence, Conflict Resolution, and Comprehensive Law, 52 Santa 
Clara L. Rev. 795 (2012).  
35 Brittany Stringfellow Otey, Millennials, Technology, and Professional 
Responsibility: Training a New Generation in Technological Professionalism, 
37 J. Legal Prof. 199 (2013). 
36 William M. Sullivan et al., EDUCATING LAWYERS:  PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].  
37 American Bar Association, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 138-41 (1992) 
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]. 
38 Roy Stuckey et al., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007). 
39 See Dolin, supra note __, at 231 (“Langdell’s method endures because, 
although his pedagogy no longer makes sense, his system makes money.”). 
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schools began to even out, scholarly discussions regarding the old 
skills-versus-doctrinal debate in law teaching reignited—
particularly because, in light of low employment statistics, the 
teaching of skills would, in theory, contribute to the competency 
and employability of students and graduates.40  Still that shift 
proceeded cautiously, and some articles in advocating skills and 
practice during this time took on a neoliberalist tone.41  Others in 
the academy, such as Edward Rubin and Robin West, have called 
for more profound changes to the core philosophy of American law 
teaching and pedagogy at this time instead.42  However, such 
critical observations have seemed to have taken a backseat for 
more short-term solutions on teaching skills because an overhaul 
of legal pedagogy would require a deeper connection drawn 
amongst perspectives on the meaning of law itself and its 
underlying theory.43  In short, despite all the crisis-talk and 
inward obsessions, the current subject matter of teaching of law 
students has a large body of technical insight and pedagogical 
discourse, but lack any unifying sense of what modern law schools 
ought to look like beyond the nineteenth-century model 
promulgated by Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School.44            
 There have been some meaningful changes.  As an era of 
reckoning drew near, accountability—moral and economic—came 
fast upon the academy like swift justice.  Questions of relevance 
regarding American law schools and traditional legal education 
has steered many law schools to quickly add phrases such as 
“practice-ready” and “experiential learning” alongside their 
traditional curricular programming and offerings in order to 
demonstrate that their current and prospective students would 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Ali, supra note ___; Petersen Jennison, supra note __.    
41 Margaret Thornton, Legal Education in the Corporate University, 10 
Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 19, 23 (2014) (discussing that in law schools the 
“discourse of skills also carries a subtext with it . . . with the term often being 
‘used interchangeably with capacity, knowledge, expertise and so forth’ and 
that ‘[s]kills tend to play a special role in the neoliberal labor market and are 
priviled over critical and theoretical knowledge.” (citation omitted)). 
42  Edward Rubin, The Future and Legal Education: Are Law Schools 
Failing and, If So, How?, 39 Law & Soc. Inquiry 499, 507 (2014) [hereinafter 
Rubin, Future and Legal Education]; West, supra note ___, at 23. 
43 See Dolin, supra note __, at 247. 
44 West, supra note __, at 27-35. 
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get their monies’ worth.45  In earnest, law school institutions had 
thoughtful intentions when they strengthened such parts of the 
law school experience that had been previously auxiliary.46  In 
theory and practice, this first wave of change had positive effects.  
Building up clinical legal education, externship, and pro bono 
requirements at law schools facilitates law graduate competency 
and, hopefully, marketability.47  They also reflect an 
acknowledgement that law practice is something one learns, in 
part, by doing.  After all, was it not Holmes who said that the life 
of the law was not merely logic but also experience?48      
 And then there were changes that were a bit more 
questionable.  A second wave of change came along that 
mandated learning assessments in legal education.49  In 2015, the 
American Bar Association (hereinafter “ABA”) passed Standards 
301, 302, 314, and 315  that required law schools to conduct 
learning assessments,50 and subsequently the law schools began 
to obey.51  Although some in the academy have urged for decades 
for law schools to implement learning assessments while others 
have vilified assessments,52 the crisis precipitated the ABA to 
pass what had only been a proposal and now all law schools began 
in-house assessments of student learning and competency.53  The 
undergraduate campuses of colleges and universities had been 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Learning Communities:  A New Model for 
Legal Education, 7 Elon L. Rev 193 (2015).   
46 See Marjorie A. Silver, Symposium Introduction:  Humanism Goes to 
Law School, 28 Touro L. Rev. 1141 (2012) (“Among other changes designed to 
expose students to what lawyers actually do in practice, we incorporated a 
requirement . . . that each of us spend a significant portion of the course 
teaching our students about alternatives to litigation.”). 
47 See generally Knauer, supra note __.    
48 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
49 American Bar Association, 2015-2016 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF 
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 15-25 (2015).   
50 Id.    
51 David Thomson, When the ABA Comes Calling, Let’s Speak the Same 
Language Assessment, 23 Perspectives:  Teaching Legal Res. & Writing 68 
(2014).  
52 Cf. Gregory S. Munro, Outcomes Assessment for Law Schools (2000), with 
Susan Hanley Duncan, The New Accreditation Standards Are Coming to A 
Law School Near You-What You Need to Know About Learning Outcomes & 
Assessment, 16 Legal Writing: J. Legal Writing Inst. 605, 610 (2010). 
53 Pistone & Horn, supra note ___.  
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engaged in these practices since the early 1980s.54  So when 
American legal education began to embrace the assessments 
movement in higher education, some suggested this embrace 
signified that law schools had finally caught up with the rest of 
American higher education.55  Conferences regarding 
assessments have, since then, taken place on various law school 
campuses nationwide.56  Faculty exchange of assessment rubrics 
have become more commonplace.57  Thoughts of distilling 
teaching and pedagogy into metrics and measurables have 
consumed much faculty governance, of late.  On the surface, the 
learning assessment movement offers a solution with the theme 
of accountability prevalent during law schools in crisis-mode, 
particularly because law schools had been famous for lacking 
little assessment action.58  Law schools can now claim that they 
are being thoughtful or self-reflective in response to questions 
about relevance that have existed in past several decades of law 
teaching.  After redesigning business models and career 
engagement, measuring how law is taught and what students 
learn seems like one method to address the curricular and 
pedagogical issues that have haunted American legal education 
for decades—issues that many have highlighted as reasons law 
schools have become irrelevant in the wake of the post-recession.  
Perhaps this was an apt time to show the world that American 
legal education was finally on the move.   
                                                 
54 Peter T. Ewell, ASSESSMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND IMPROVEMENT:  
REVISITING THE TENSION 5 (2009) (citing Peter T. Ewell, Assessment, 
Accountability, and Improvement: Managing the Contradiction (1987)); Dolin, 
supra note ___, at 224.  
55 Anthony Niedwiecki, Law Schools and Learning Outcomes: Developing A 
Coherent, Cohesive, and Comprehensive Law School Curriculum, 64 Clev. St. 
L. Rev. 661, 664 (2016) (“In light of these fundamental changes, criticisms, 
recommendations, and requirements, law schools must now be more deliberate 
in the planning of their curriculum so it is coherent, cohesive, and 
comprehensive.”). 
56 See, e.g., April 2014: Assessment Across the Curriculum (conference), 
INST. FOR LAW TEACHING & LEARNING (Apr. 2014), 
http://lawteaching.org/conferences/april-2014-assessment-across-the-
curriculum/. 
57 See, e.g., Resources, INST. FOR LAW TEACHING & LEARNING (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2014), http://lawteaching.org/resources/. 
58 Ron M. Aizen, Four Ways to Better 1L Assessments, 54 Duke L.J. 765, 
767 (2004). 
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 But while many have written about the pros and cons of 
assessment and explored exactly how how to assess, few people 
have contemplated the big, existential “So what?” questions to 
ask once law schools have done their assessments.  What exactly 
are we trying to find through assessments?  And will we find it?  
Genuine, thoughtful motivations to perform in-house assessments 
keep law schools accountable, but political motivations for 
requiring assessments is not a moral response to the law school 
crisis.  In this way, over-blown, chest-pounding hopes that 
assessments will overhaul American legal education ought to be 
suspect and tamed.  The assessments movement in legal 
education is only skin-deep; it is a new fad.  Not only that, but the 
fad is one that officially ushers the view that law schools are now 
part of the age of neoliberalism and corporatized higher education 
institutions.59  Should all of this give pessimists some pause?  
Absolutely.  To be sure, done earnestly and correctly, learning 
assessments offer much utility to improve quality education.  The 
process is short-sighted when we neglect what we will do after the 
results of assessment have come in, but rather allow our results 
to skew responses that all is good with our status quo.  In this 
way, the assessment process is also not completely objective and 
scientific.   
This Article is about answering the yearning for a lasting, 
meaningful change to American law teaching philosophy in this 
time of crisis for American law schools.  As Robin West has 
articulated, “just as [w]e cannot address our economic crisis in a 
meaningful way without the existential, we cannot do the inverse 
of that either.”60  A little over a century’s time of establishing and 
formalizing a significant tradition of American legal education 
has passed.61  Yet still, law schools continue to impart knowledge 
and training using a pedagogy steeped in the nineteenth 
century62—while the current state of the law and law practice has 
surpassed a reliance on the common law, and while predominant 
ways of reaching doctrinal resolutions to new controversies and 
                                                 
59 See Bonnie Urciuoli, The Language of Higher Education Assessment: 
Legislative Concerns in A Global Context, 12 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 183, 
183-84 (2005). 
60 West, supra note __, at 212. 
61 Peterson Jennison, supra note ___, at 646. 
62 Dolin, supra note __, at 222.  
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disputes do not always rely on reading ancient and seminal 
appellate decisions.  It is no wonder why lawyers are pessimistic.  
We are taught to be that way as an indirect result of our current 
pedagogy.63  The optimistic silver lining in this time of crisis 
ought to have been a moment of clarity that allowed us to 
examine with critical and scholarly eyes what relevance a 
methodology guided by “law as science,” in the Langdellian sense, 
remained presently.  How we envision the law manifests in the 
pedagogy and methods of its study.  What this Article offers is a 
new paradigm for conceptualizing meaning in law for the 
purposes to engender more relevance and empowerment—one 
that can navigate beyond assessments, but more importantly, 
allow individuals to think rigorously and learn about the law in a 
more current and meaningful way.  This Article’s ultimate 
recommendation for the American legal academy is toward a post-
Langdellian conception of law that perceives and defines law by 
its deliberate instrumentalities, rather as a form of science.  The 
ensuing pages, hopefully, will clarify the meaning of that 
heuristic shared by this Article’s title, “law as instrumentality.”  
Apart from this Part I Introduction, Part II of this Article 
will discuss the specific history and background of American legal 
education and the rise of the Langdellian case method pedagogy 
in American law schools.  Part III will then examine the case 
method’s effects on modern-day students.  Finally, before the 
Article’s conclusion, Part IV will introduce the instrumentality 
conception of law and its underlying philosophy that shifts away 
from the unified and scientific paradigm of the Langdellian 
scientific conception by theorizing law from fragmentation and 
then gathering meaning from the human-made aspects of law’s 
agency.  A brief exploration of what a law classroom situated by 
“law as instrumentality” might look like pedagogically will also 
occur in Part IV as well.   
In its intentions, the Article seeks out to theorize the type 
of deep and profound reform that not only will help restrain the 
pessimists from jumping ship but changes that American legal 
education deserves.    
                                                 
63 Dolin, supra note __, at 222. 
2017]                   LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY                         13 
II. THE GHOST SHIP OF LANGDELLIAN FORMALISM 
A. Origin and Influence in Methodology 
Our inquiry begins by lowering our sails in the late 
nineteenth century.  Especially in the last several decades of 
historicism, some debate has emerged regarding the complete and 
total attribution of the case method to Christopher Langdell.64  
Although scholars have documented and mapped out a general 
insight regarding Langdell’s law teachings, philosophy, and 
tenure at Harvard Law School,65 some have suggested that much 
sifting and combing is still needed but may never be completely 
done in terms of a comprehensive study of the man.66  After all, 
the archives at Harvard house some 7,000 pages of Langdell’s 
own notes, taken on loose-leaf in his illegible hand, a majority of 
which remains yet to be deciphered.67  Additionally, another 
several thousand pages of his papers were purposely destroyed in 
the 1940s, perhaps as suggested in a reactionary fit of the legal 
realists, based on ideologies splits from the formalists.68  All in 
all, not unlike our knowledge of many other figures in history, 
                                                 
64 See Bruce A Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of 
Historiography, 1906-2000s, 22 Law & Hist. Rev. 277, 296–97 (2004).  Kimball 
notes that “[p]articularly in regard to [Langdell’s] signature teaching method, 
the revisionists maintained that Langdell did not invent case method or that, if 
he did, then he did not really practice it or that, if he invented and practiced it, 
then he really did not understand its nature and purpose. Demonstrated by 
their inconsistency, the purpose of these efforts was apparently to elevate a 
revered mentor, as in the case of Beale, or the favorite son of a law school, as 
with Columbia or Mississippi, or generally to demonstrate that “not literally all 
good things are first thought of in Cambridge.” (quoting Alfred Z. Reed, 
Training for the Public Profession of the Law (New York: Carnegie Foundation 
for the Advancement of Teaching, 1921), Bulletin no. 15, p. 372.). 
65 See generally id.  
66 See id. at 330-31.    
67 Id. at 281. 
68 See id.  Kimball observed that “some 3,000 papers—possibly including 
letters, financial records, and lectures—were discarded in 1941” and that “this 
literal trashing of Langdell occurred contemporaneously with the high tide of 
Holmes’s ‘hagiography.’ “  Id.  Kimball later described the hagiography of 
Holmes as period when the legal realists interjected “a uniformly derogatory 
view of Langdell” that peaked at a “high water mark” with the destruction of 
Langdell’s papers when the realists dominated American legal thought.  Id. at 
304-05.  
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there will always be something unknowable and incomplete in 
our understanding of Langdell and his contributions to modern 
American legal education.69  Over the years, that gap in our 
conscious knowledge of Langdell has likely supported our awe,70 
our reverence,71 our vilification,72 our parody,73 and our revision 
of his legacy74—for whatever goals such reactions have served our 
purposes.75  Ultimately, however, such endeavors always fail in 
obtaining a definitive truth of the matter.  We can never really 
know a person.76 
                                                 
69 Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Osler, Langdell, and the Atelier: Three Tales of 
Creation in Professional Education, 10 Legal Comm. & Rhetoric: JALWD 151, 
185 (2013) (“[I]n the legal profession for which he invented the signature 
pedagogical method, Langdell is virtually unknown.”). 
70 Austen G. Fox, Professor Langdell—His Personal Influence, 20 Harv. L. 
Rev. 7-8 (1906) (eulogizing Langdell by noting at the start of his teaching at 
Harvard students knew “that a great teacher had come among us and we were 
led to seek you out”).  
71 William LaPiana, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 168-69 (1994) (defending 
Langdell against criticisms of his contributions to legal education and the case 
method). 
72 Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
907, 907- 08 (1933) (painting Langdell as misguided in his practice of law and 
how that translated to some of his development of the case method and why 
“[d]ue to Langdell’s idiosyncracies, law school law came to mean ‘library-law’ “). 
73 Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACTS 5 1974 (famously beginning 
his book with a remark about the centennial development of Langdell’s work 
on contracts, specifically observing that “[i]t was just a hundred years ago that 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, like his namesake four centuries earlier, set 
sail over uncharted seas and inadvertently discovered a New World”) (citations 
omitted).  
74 See Kimball, supra note ___, at 311 (observing that during the mid-
twentieth century, “the scholarship on Langdell had ignored most of the 
evidence that would normally be considered in a scholarly analysis of a 
historical figure”). 
75 See e.g. Jeremiah A. Ho, Function, Form, and Strawberries: Subverting 
Langdell, 64 J. Legal Educ. 656 (2015) (using Langdell as a counterpoint for 
developing active learning methods); see also Gilmore, THE AGES OF AMERICAN 
LAW 42 (1977) (“[I]f Langdell had not existed, we would have had to invent 
him.”); Gilmore, Death of Contract, supra note ___, at 13 n. 20 (“Professor 
Sutherland reproduces an astonishing portrait of Langdell (“painted . . . in the 
twenty-second year of [His] deanship”) which could perfectly well be a portrait 
of the original Christopher Columbus.”).    
76 See e.g. John Henry Schlegel, Book Review of Kronman, Anthony, The 
Lost Lawyer & LaPiana, William, Logic and Experience, 14 Law & History 
Review 369 (1996).  In comparing two books on Langdell, Schlegel observes 
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Of course, a funny irony one might draw from all of this is 
a parallel between the futility of completely getting to know a 
person, such as Langdell, and the way in which Langdell’s 
nineteenth-century theorizing of law as science itself—presuming 
law to be unified and complete in nature, formalist and objective 
in approach77—had its own futility and shortcomings as well.78  
The philosophical wheels in one’s mind can readily churn away at 
reconciling those observations; but whatever shortcomings and 
contestations exist over fully crediting Langdell with the case 
method in American law schools, all controversies steps aside for 
the fact that such a pedagogy has defined American law teaching 
for over a century’s time.79  That observation is, indeed, true with 
ample examples to bolster it.80  Arising in the 1870s, the case 
method was one of the features of the new law school model in 
American universities, promoted strongly by Harvard Law School 
through the teachings and innovations of Langdell.81  Although 
the use of appellate opinions in law teaching was not necessarily 
new,82 the case method’s wholesale pedagogical emphasis on court 
opinions was embraced as a novelty for the study of law,83 which 
itself was fast becoming an academic discipline during this 
                                                                                                                            
how one book’s context was “infinitely deeper” than the other’s but was still 
“simply not deep enough.  No one’s ever is, of course.” Id. at 372. 
77 West, supra note __, at 71 n. 70 (noting that the Langdellian formalists 
believed in the “autonomy and completeness of the common law: the common 
law was autonomous from all other legal orders as well as from all other 
sources of authority, whether cultural or political, and it was sufficient to 
answer all questions, not just most”).     
78 Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human 
Subject, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 227, 249 (2002) (describing that “[w]hile imputing the 
prestige of science to law,  Langdell and those in his image simply fail to tell us 
exactly what the ‘legal scientist’ is doing to know law’s ‘axioms.’ “). 
79 Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 
Vill. L. Rev. 517, 520-21 (1991). 
80 See id.at 527-31 (discussing Langdell’s influence on the ideology of law as 
science and how that was taught to students at Harvard); see also id at 531 
(describing Langdell’s development of the casebook); id. at 532 (discussing 
Langdell’s recasting of the “professor’s role” in the classroom through the 
Socratic method). 
81 Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 468 (3d ed. 2005).   
82 James Williard Hurst, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW 
MAKERS 261 (1950); Robert Stevens, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
AMERICAN FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 52 n. 14 (1983). 
83 Id. at 52-53.  
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time.84  Summarily, the case method’s features involve the use of 
appellate court cases to demonstrate common law principles 
within a specific body of law.85  Its signature classroom technique 
is two-fold:  first, in the use of heavily-edited casebooks that 
contain appellate decisions selected to authoritatively illustrate a 
legal principle, and secondly, in the classroom use of the Socratic 
dialogue of inquiry-and-answer between lecturer and students, 
where the lecturer would question students on assigned case 
decisions and hypotheticals in order to extract significant legal 
rules and principles.86     
Along with the eventual rise in prominence of Harvard’s 
law school, the case method—as employed by Langdell and his 
peers there—received gradual widespread adoption in the lecture 
rooms at other law schools in the country.87  At first, other 
competing law schools were reluctant to use the method.88  
Eventually, over the twentieth century, however, the case 
method’s popularity gradually gained traction and the acceptance 
of the method at law schools nationwide was systemic.89  In 
modern-day American law schools, the Langdellian case method, 
despite augmentation with the problem method and other 
teaching techniques, still endures as the dominant form of 
instruction in classrooms.90  Internationally, the case method has 
its followers at law programs in other countries as well.91  Its 
influence in modeling and developing generations of American 
law faculty has been profound.92  And even pop-culturally, the 
                                                 
84 Id. at 52. 
85 Id. at 52-53. 
86 Philip C. Kissam, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF 
MODERN LAWYERS 37-50 (2003). 
87 Weaver, supra note ___, at 596 n. 70. 
88 See id. at 541-42 (describing how “[t]he transition began slowly” and 
mentioning that in 1894, the ABA had reported that the lecture method was 
still prevalent in law instruction).    
89 See Stevens, supra note ___, at 64 (observing statistically the rise in 
number of law schools in the early 1900s adopting the case method); see also 
Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell: Innovating in Legal Education, 
62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 643, 646–47 (2013). 
90 Weaver, supra note __, at 543-45. 
91 E.g., Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in China Through U.S.-
Inspired Transplants, 59 J. Legal Educ. 60, 76 (2009). 
92 Id. at 544. 
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case method’s notorious dialogic style of classroom teaching has 
seen its most acerbic Hollywood screen variants93    
But despite being a teaching method with only two major 
signature characteristics or components (the casebook and the 
Socratic dialogue), these characteristics, in principle, underscore 
a larger conception of the law, one that was both personal to 
Langdell and reflective of the post-Antebellum age of American 
law and law schools: Langdell’s case method was grounded in the 
formalist notion of law as science.94  This conception embodied in 
an ideal of scientific methods as applied to the study and practice 
of law, which Langdell considered as a scientific entity in nature.  
The belief was that the result of this application would lead one to 
discover paradigmatic legal principles within the world and its 
disputes.95  Although the “law-as-science” conception was not 
likely original to Langdell, his notion of law as science possessed 
a certain rational empiricism that would have facilitated 
inquiries upon the law with favor toward a nineteenth-century 
scientific methodology.96  So as science, the law must be studied 
                                                 
93 E.g. Legally Blonde (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001); The Paper Chase 
(Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1973). 
94 Friedman, supra note ___, at 468-69.  
95 See Nancy Cook, Law As Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the 
21st Century, 88 N.D. L. Rev. 21, 22 (2012). 
96 M. H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 
30 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95, 119 (1986).  Hoeflich notes that Langdell’s approach 
“had two components: empiricism and rationalism.” Id. In fact, such attributes 
added to the method’s appeal with the figures at Harvard during Langdell’s 
time:    
 
It was the empirical aspect of Langdell’s concept that was 
most consonant with Harvard President Eliot’s and other 
contemporaries’ ideas about science. Science was something 
that one did. The term connoted investigation and 
experimentation. Thus, Langdell argued that jurists and legal 
scholars were also empirical investigators. They sought for 
legal principles rather than physical rules. The sources of their 
raw data were not chemical compounds or heavenly bodies, but 
rather legal facts, facts to be found in appellate cases. The 
rational aspect of the Langdellian notion of legal science dove-
tailed with the empirical aspect. The rational aspect of the 
Langdellian model quite simply was the belief that legal 
reasoning must be deductive.   
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accordingly.  The oft-examined quotation from the preface of his 
original casebook on contract law alludes to the way Langdell 
conflated his scientific conception of the law with the learning of 
it:      
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain 
principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of 
these as to be able to apply them with constant 
facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of 
human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; 
and hence to acquire that mastery should be the 
business of every earnest student of law. Each of 
these doctrines has arrived at its present state by 
slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, 
extending in many cases through centuries. This 
growth is to be traced in the main through a series of 
cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only 
way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by 
studying the cases in which it is embodied.97 
Scholars and critics alike have linked Langdell’s conception of the 
law with the other developments at Harvard Law that were 
auxiliary and yet consistent to the rise of the case method in the 
lecture hall.  For instance, the law library’s development as an 
important and central space in the law school, akin to the 
scientific laboratory, was a notable feature.98   Other 
developments such as the curriculum,99 the length of a law 
program,100 faculty as full-time teachers and scholars,101 and 
                                                                                                                            
Id. at 119-20.  However, Hoeflich also notes that deductive nature of Langdell’s 
paradigm reveals how “Langdell’s notion of law as a rational science, therefore, 
was anything but unique or innovative. Indeed, to a very large extent, the 
Langdellian concept of legal science simply echoed Mayes, Legaré, Stewart, 
Leibniz, and other earlier jurists.” Id. at 120.    
97 C.C. Langdell, A SELECTION OF CASES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS WITH 
REFERENCES AND CITATIONS  vi (1871). 
98 Beatrice A. Tice, The Academic Law Library in the 21st Century: Still the 
Heart of the Law School, 1 UC Irvine L. Rev. 159, 164–65 (2011). 
99 Friedman, supra note ___, at 471-72. 
100 Id. at 466.  
101 Id. 
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faculty scholarship102 all reflected this rational and empirical 
scientific conception. 
 An illustrative way of unpacking the Langdellian ideal of 
law as science in his case method is to explore the meaning and 
significance of its most defining heuristic: “thinking like a 
lawyer.”  Although the origins of this phrase is unclear, “thinking 
like a lawyer” has characteristically tethered itself as the moniker 
that American law schools do in training lawyers, and thus 
serving nearly as an imprimatur of the Langdellian case 
method.103  Indeed, to some certain extent, this purpose of the 
Langdellian law school exemplified his rationalist assumptions 
about the law; if the law is science, then the primary concern of a 
legal education would be to develop the legal mind—and 
“thinking” would extenuate that.104  Over the years, the phrase, 
“thinking like a lawyer,” has weathered both praise and criticism, 
and yielded both patina and tarnish.  Standing from a twenty-
first century vantage point, the phrase in this crisis time appears 
more tarnished than gilded.  Yet, a simple exegetical close-read of 
the phrase itself helps us understand the Langdellian formalism 
for law and pedagogy that the phrase invokes. 
First, “thinking like a lawyer,” reveals a scientific 
conception of law in how its form appeals to the scientific inquiry 
of the nineteenth century.  Alternative pedagogical conceptions of 
law teaching could have been “arguing like a lawyer”—which 
would have emphasized rhetoric or even the concept of “law as 
rhetoric.”  It could have also been “practicing like a lawyer”—
which would have invariably conceived of “law as process,” or 
(gasp) “law as a trade,” bringing out excessive anxiety in Langdell 
and many of his Brahmin peers.105  Here, however, the act of 
“thinking” is singled out as the sole thing that law schools must 
instill, displacing all other functions and engagements between a 
                                                 
102 See Kimball, supra __, at 283. 
103 Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like A Lawyer: 
Analyzing the Cognitive Components of the Analytical Mind, 29 Campbell L. 
Rev. 413, 419 (2007). 
104 Id. 
105 Eric Shimamoto, Comment, To Take Arms Against A See of Trouble: 
Legal Citation and the Reassertion of Hierarchy, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 443, 448 
(2004). 
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lawyer and the law.  This isolation of “thinking” is both 
significant and deliberate.  “Thinking,” on one hand, could have 
been set up here to ignore all other things that a practicing 
lawyer would do; and conversely, it could also empirically 
represent all the things within a Langdellian sensibility that a 
practicing lawyer does—after all one reading of Langdell’s notion 
for “mastering” the “certain doctrines or principles” of law as 
science is that any mastery begins categorically with thinking 
about the law.106  Either way, the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” 
elevates mind over action and underscores that the pedagogical 
crux in Langdell’s case method is a type of inquiry or mental 
perspective that Langdell would have considered “lawyerly.”   
If the law is a science, then this type of inquiry would 
appear to be rigorous, but also lofty, and perhaps even abstract at 
times.  It would not be menial or banal, but instead exists as a 
worthy type of thinking that, like the sciences and empiricism, 
deserved a place at the university.  The use of “thinking” in 
“thinking like a lawyer” perhaps reflected the push for 
prominence of lawyers in the post-antebellum America of the 
nineteenth century.107  Indeed, that is the perception that the 
case method, as it was classically used in law school lecture halls, 
attempts to convey as it purports to make law students “think 
like lawyers.”  As the examination of appellate opinions proceeds, 
the Socratic dialogue between the professor and students about 
those case opinions attempts to approximate what scientists 
would do.108  Regardless of whether that is truly what scientists 
do or not, the heart of that “thinking” or inquiry in the law course 
is inductive.  The examination of a closed universe of cases 
typically assumes, in case method fashion, a method of discovery 
that helps to enlighten upon certain legal principles to be used to 
predict future outcomes of disputes.109  This is typically where the 
inductive reasoning takes place.  To glance even more narrowly 
                                                 
106 Langdell, supra note ___, at vi. 
107 Bruce A. Kimball, THE TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL IN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY 107-08 (1995) (describing the law profession’s rise to prominence after 
the American Civil War). 
108 Jeffrey D. Jackson, Socrates and Langdell in Legal Writing: Is the 
Socratic Method A Proper Tool for Legal Writing Courses?, 43 Cal. W. L. Rev. 
267, 270 (2007). 
109 Stevens, supra note ___, at 53. 
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into that inductive reasoning, the case method prompts students 
to render or intuit the results of cases by deciding categorically 
how similar they are to previous cases or how distinct they are.110  
Moreover, there is rational, left-brain logic in the endeavor, which 
adds to the abstraction.  Although the facts of cases might vary 
from dispute to dispute, one assumes under Langdellian concept 
of law that the legal principles that guide the direction of cases 
are discoverable and unwavering and just.  Put in such terms, at 
times, there is a dispassionate feel to this inductive reasoning—
not unlike “higher mathematics,” according to Lawrence 
Friedman.111  All in all, the “thinking” in “thinking like a lawyer,” 
as the case method’s use of the Socratic dialogue demonstrates, 
conveys the impression of a hermetic scientific method that 
discounts experimentation and experience as part of the scientific 
engagement, but one that favors studying legal concepts isolated 
in abstraction or a vacuum.112  This emphasizes the case method 
differentiated itself from the “text-book method” of law school 
instruction that was the fashion in American law schools prior to 
Langdell’s ascendancy at Harvard in the 1870s.113                      
 Another way that the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” 
reflects the case method pedagogy is in the way that the phrase 
case can conjure the concept of law as Langdell and the formalists 
envisioned.  The phrase reveals its Langdellian conception of 
legal science if one asks just exactly what that lawyer was 
supposed to “think” about at the inception of the case method at 
Harvard.  The discovery of isolated legal concepts in Langdell’s 
inductive case method presumes that the inquiry leads to a 
complete and organic version of the common law, devoid of 
contextual variables; again, this impression exemplifies 
Langdell’s conception of law as science, a science that stems from 
universal principles evolved through time.114  But the way 
Langdell considered the law as science and the way his described 
it harbored inconsistencies on the surface.  First, he treated the 
                                                 
110 West, supra note __, at 50. 
111 Friedman, supra note ___, at 472. 
112 Id. at 472. 
113 See id. at 466. 
114 See id. at 473 (“The unity of the some parts of the common law was a 
fact.  Langdell’s abstractions, however, ignored the nature of law as a living 
system, rooted in time, place, and circumstance.”) 
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law as if it was not evolving—that by sifting and culling through 
cases like sediment, a universal truth of the law could be 
scientifically and archeologically uncovered.115  However, he also 
described how such common-law principles had evolved over time, 
for instance, in the way he organized cases chronologically in his 
contracts casebook to show a development. Perhaps in this culling 
between good and bad cases, the more lawyers of thought about 
principles over the centuries, the more we arrived at the truth of 
these legal principles.  Or perhaps the law never evolved; under a 
Langdellian, formalist sensibility, the law was always “there” in 
the natural world of cases, pre-dating humans in some mystical 
organic form, and merely waiting to be found for our judicial 
benefit—or quite possibly the inconsistencies reveal some human 
sleight of hand.  Moreover, not only does this idea of the 
completeness of the law seem stagnant, if, in whatever way, the 
law has really ceased to evolve; but also in the ritualized 
dogmatic practice of the case method, it would add an autopsy feel 
to the whole study of case law.  To Langdell, however, the 
completeness of the law did not indicate stagnancy; but rather the 
presumption and belief that law was complete signaled its 
autonomy.116  To Langdell, his observed scientific disposition of 
law suggested that law existed in nature apart from man, to be 
discovered, to be studied, but not to be augmented.  Thus, it is 
tempting to make the metaphoric analogy that Langdell’s case 
method was like the attempt to find a natural resource, and once 
found, its application to existing and future legal problems was 
unadulterated.  In describing the importance of the law library, 
Langdell’s own words seem to allude to this:  “We have also 
constantly inculcated the idea that the library is the proper 
workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to us all that 
the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and 
physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologists, the 
botanical garden to the botanists.”117  The law library was the 
                                                 
115 Id. at 472.  
116 Rob Atkinson, Law As A Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission 
Field of the Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 621, 627 (2001). 
117 Christopher Columbus  Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 Law 
Q. Rev. 123, 124 (1887). 
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laboratory and to find the law, we would go to its printed 
books.118  So there, law was a science. 
An important hidden assumption of Langdell’s conception 
of the law was its perceived perfection.  Buttressed by then-
current values of objectivity and empiricism in the sciences, 
Langdell conceived of the law as “objective” and perfect as well.  
Of course, in this way, like the sciences, law deserved a place for 
true academic prestige and study at the university, away from the 
connotations of previous incarnations of American law schools 
that emphasized rote-memory and daily recitations on the law.  
The features of the Langdellian casebook exemplify this peculiar 
conception of law as this unique academic science.  The original 
casebooks assembled and used at Harvard during Langdell’s 
tenure were merely a collection of cases, without notes, and 
devoid of social or political contexts.119  The cases reflected the 
English common law tradition; for instance, most of the cases in 
Langdell’s contracts casebook were English cases while American 
cases were fewer and mostly from New York and Massachusetts 
courts.120  Of course, questions of true objectivity would arise to 
challenge Langdell’s assumptions in the canonical assembling of 
these cases for instruction, if they were to exemplify the perfect 
unity of the common law.  But for Langdell, the dogma of the 
common law would allow him to ignore that point; after all, even 
in the preface of his casebook, he defended his selection of cases 
by pointing to “good” and “bad” cases:   
[T]he cases which are useful and necessary for this 
purpose [of study] at the present day bear an 
exceedingly small proportion to all that have been 
reported.  The vast majority are useless, and worse 
than useless, for any purpose of systematic study.  
Moreover the number of fundamental legal doctrines 
is much less than is commonly supposed; the many 
different guises in which the same doctrine is 
constantly making its appearance, and the great 
extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of 
                                                 
118 See id. 
119 Friedman, supra note __, at 482. 
120 Id. at 469. 
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each other, being the cause of much 
misapprehension.121   
There is an almost Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest feeling 
here—as Langdell described the process of collecting these 
artifact cases in his book.122  And it was Darwin’s scientific theory 
that promoted a sense of objectivity.123  Like species being guided 
by an invisible hand toward survival in evolutionary biology, the 
“fittest” cases and legal principles survived in Langdell’s world of 
legal science to be refined by thinking academically about 
them.124  Other than the inclusion of good cases and the exclusion 
of bad ones, the process of finding such good cases in Langdell’s 
contracts casebook were divided and arranged topically, with 
cases in each topic presented in chronology, “showing an evolution 
of principles from darkness to light.”125  Moreover, no statutes 
were included in his casebook.126  With the casebook, students 
were to distill or find the legal principles contained in such cases 
and believe that such principles were fixed and able to resolve 
future cases.  Thus, the form of the Langdellian casebook was 
mimetic of Langdell’s creed about the common law as science.  
The casebook was both self-contained and empirical in 
presentation, hermetic unto itself and steeped strictly in a near-
exegetical tradition of the common law.127  All of these features of 
an untouchable perfection were the envisioned law to be “thought 
about” in “thinking like a lawyer.”  
    The more one examines the Langdellian case method in 
this partially destabilized and critical fashion, the more apparent 
that Langdell’s conception of “law as science” had some of the 
spirit of what law is—especially as embodied within the English 
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common law tradition of law—but the conception at times was 
also heavily and ironically artificial.  The exclusion of certain 
cases in his teachings, cases of “local diversity” for instance, over 
English “canonical” cases was motivated by aspirations of 
elevating legal studies as a unitary science across the United 
States.128  Accordingly, in assuming authority by presiding over 
the pedagogy and teaching methodology at Harvard in the 1870s, 
Langdell was able to elevate himself and his formalist conception; 
in Lawrence Friedman’s words “[t]here was only one common law; 
Langdell was its prophet. . . . Oceans could not sever the unity of 
common law; it was one and indivisible . . . .”129  First was the 
sense of intellectual hierarchy that perpetuated itself; the 
common law was elevated and Langdell along with it.130  Others 
have elaborated more functionally about Langdell’s sleight of 
hand, describing the results of situating himself at the head of 
this brand of formalism:  “Landgell, the interpreter of the law, 
never let the reader know that it was he, rather than the ‘law,’ 
that created the discourse and conducted the analysis.”131  
Langdell’s conception reinforced a way to speak about the law 
that was detached from the subject in its formalism.  Rather, 
perceiving law as science led to viewing and dissecting law in 
assumptions of completeness and in isolating abstraction.  As a 
result, this formalist way of viewing the law bears a “hidden 
assumption of the autonomous legal subject,” which is 
theoretically problematic.132  Langdell’s formalism “proceeded as 
if law itself was speaking to the reader and hence capable of 
creating its own meaning:  ‘The law, like a subject, did things; 
doctrines became subjects, and did things to each other.’ ”133  That 
view was what law’s complete autonomy implied and was created 
by “the objectification of law” where “legal rules are explained, 
analyzed, and criticized as if they were transcendental objects 
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unaffected by analyzing subjects.”134  In both method and content, 
Langdell’s “law as science” fetishized ways to view the law in 
perfected form and ignored “inconsistences” for an idealized 
perfection cast as scientific objectivity—even though it could not 
have been truly objective or scientific if one had to discover the 
law by looking selectively backward in time in “printed books.”135  
Moreover, Langdell’s “law as science” was a science that ignored 
experimentation and context.136  It left the lawyer as an observer, 
detached from law’s evolution because the common law was no 
longer assumed to be evolving.  Accordingly, law was to be 
written about “in the passive voice” and to be “rigorously 
maintain[ed in] the detached demeanor of a scientist conducting a 
controlled experiment.”137  No subject existed, apart from the law 
itself, in the legal principles drawn from the opinions that 
Langdell and his students examined in Harvard law courses—
despite these opinion’s judicial authorships.  Langdell’s own 
theory of the law—his own peculiar science—and methodology 
reveals that he was more or less an exegete.138  The law was 
perfect—or perfected in abstraction—and as a lawyer, one could 
only think within the restrictions of that perfection, not beyond.   
That was the dogma of the Langdell’s legal science.  His 
conception of law was taught and perpetuated through its case 
method dissection of common law cases to students at Harvard 
and then nationally thereafter; after World War I, the emergence 
of numerous American law schools replicated the case method as 
American legal education’s conspicuous pedagogy in lecture halls 
throughout the United States.139  Accordingly, generations of 
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American law students have “thought like lawyers” and 
objectified the law under Langdell’s conception of legal science.  
B. The Neglect of Realism 
While the widespread use of the Langdellian case method 
was solidifying in American law schools in the 1920s and 1930s, 
legal realism came to dominate American legal thought.140  An 
earlier version of realism had co-existed with the Langdellian 
formalists during the late nineteenth century, with Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., as one of its inspirational founding 
patriarchs.141  Holmes, who taught at Langdell’s Harvard during 
the 1870s, withheld the beliefs of formalism and did not share 
Langdell’s concept that that common law was unified and 
complete.142  Rather, Holmes’ concept of the common law 
embraced a “pragamatic historicism,” which relied on “experience 
as an objective source of knowledge.”143  History has paired 
Langdell and Holmes against each other, but the rise of their 
respective schools of legal thought was not simultaneous.  As 
Stephen Feldman has described, the realists followed the 
formalists in the period of legal modernism in American law, with 
Holmes’ ideas joined subsequently by the writings of Roscoe 
Pound and Benjamin Cardozo and even later by the likes of 
Jerome Frank, Felix Cohen, and Karl Llewellyn.144       
The realists assailed against Langdell’s formalist 
conception of law as science.  Pound famously called Langdell’s 
formalism “mechanical jurisprudence.”145  On the whole, the 
realists “denounced the abstract and decontextualized 
rationalism of Langdellian legal science as unrelated to 
meaningful social reality, unrelated to human experiences of the 
external world.”146  They pointed out the fallacy of Langdell’s 
scientific objectivity:  “Whereas Langdellian scholars claimed that 
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their abstract reasoning enabled them to discover objective legal 
truths—the rules and principles of the common law—realists 
such as Felix Cohen belittled the Langdellian rules and principles 
as ‘transcendental nonsense.’ ”147  The realist movement took 
dominance of the high seas of American legal thought away from 
the Langdellian formalists, but from within the movement itself, 
there was a spectrum of disparity amongst its prominent 
thinkers.148  Still, the realist reaction against the Langdellian 
notion of unity and objectivity of law as science was 
undeniable.149  Ultimately, what the realists offered as a response 
to Langdellian formalism was to “cause the predicative value of 
doctrine to be seriously questioned.”150  They questioned and 
torpedoed Langdell’s objectivity until that objectivity was 
substantially submerged.151        
The realists did not exempt Langdellian innovations of the 
American law school from scrutiny.152  Jerome Frank famously 
made his views known that “[t]he law student, should learn while 
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For instance, to determine whether a court has jurisdiction 
over a corporation, a Langdellian would ask, “Where is the 
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in school, the art of legal practice.  And to that end, the law 
schools should boldly, not slyly and evasively, repudiate the false 
dogmas of Langdell.”153  In a more hypothesized tone, Karl 
Llewellyn later expressed his views about the Langdellian 
dependence on appellate cases by contrasting it with the case 
approach used in business schools:  “Consider, for example, the 
possibility of building up our so-called cases out beyond the 
judicial opinion into something resembling the completeness of 
the cases gathered for the Harvard Business School.”154  In their 
own respective right, Frank and Llewellyn as realists, both 
beckoned for the kind of practical training for lawyers that 
steered beyond Langdell’s case method.155  Yet, the questioning 
fell short of leading to deep and comprehensive changes in 
existing Langdellian legal pedagogy:  “The criticism of the case 
method came under fire in the 1920s and 1930s from legal 
scholars of the Legal Realist movement, even while it continued 
as part of American law school training.”156  There was, of course, 
some noticeable modifications: the inclusion of clinical legal 
education and the contextualization of social sciences into the law 
school curriculum with new courses that were 
interdisciplinary.157  But heavy dependence on appellate opinions 
in law school classes persisted.  The Socratic dialogue continued 
to be employed in lectures.  In spite of adding supporting 
materials alongside cases in the law casebook,158 the core of the 
text was still comprised of topical collections of appellate case 
opinions.  Accordingly, “[d]espite the realist critique, the use of 
the case method as a pedagogical tool for developing exacting 
analyses of a legal problem continued to be used throughout the 
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twentieth century and remains a part of law school 
instruction.”159   
Some irony exists in this neglect, particularly when one 
notes how the realists dominated over the American legal 
academy in the early decades of the twentieth century.  One 
would have believed that the realists’ disagreement with Langdell 
would have prompted some significant changes to Langdell’s case 
method pedagogy in American law teaching.  But at the core of 
realism, if the law was not Langdell’s Darwinian notion of science 
any longer, the law had become a social science.  Perhaps this 
transition was why—even when other movements of legal 
thought emerged such as legal process in the 1950s,160 and then 
in the 1970s and thereafter, schools such as law and economics, 
critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, law and literature, 
and critical race theory—law schools continued to use the case 
method long after the age of American legal realism.161  
With the realists, law was not science, but social science.162  
This conception embedded itself in the case method pedagogy, 
creating a neat retrofit to Langdell’s case method rather than a 
wholesale move to another entirely new instructional practice; 
according to Friedman, “Langdell’s system was repackaged as a 
superior kind of skills training; . . . the method taught the student 
how to ‘think like a lawyer.’  This meant mastering the law school 
brand of mental acrobatics, along with the fine art of 
argument.”163  Perhaps this lack of change reflects the limitation 
of realist conceptions of law from being totally and completely 
different from formalism.  In any event, as a result of this retrofit, 
the objectification of law that had underscored the practice of 
Langdell’s case method remained in some shape in later case 
method usage in law schools.  Even past the last century, whether 
advertently or not, professors have instilled that objectification to 
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students in their law classes, even though legal theorists no 
longer subscribe to Langdellian conceptions.164  The form of the 
case method, as used in American law schools today, replicates 
the ceremony of objectification, even if law as science has been 
replaced by something else.165  The examination of law through 
the indoctrinated rituals of professorial questioning-and-
answering, the perceived primacy of appellate case decisions, and 
the same line-up of subject courses in the first-year curriculum 
since Langdell’s Harvard days suggest that, devoid of the 
Langdellian scientific perspective of law, the remnant form of 
Langdell’s methodology might still be steering students and 
scholars toward a similar type of regard for the law.166  And all of 
this continuance of the case method has been the status quo for 
decades.  In terms of pedagogy then, what American law schools 
have been sailing on since the legal realists is the ghost ship of 
Langdell.   
In an existential observation about American law schools 
in the post-Recession crisis, Robin West has suggested the cause 
and implications of the hesistancy to move beyond Langdell’s case 
method, despite modern rejections of Langdell’s conception of law:   
   Contemporary law students are receiving the 
benefit of a belated recognition that in his desire to 
separate the study of law from the society of society 
Langdell was spectacularly wrong: law is not 
autonomous from other cultural, economic, 
historical, and philosophical forces, and should not 
be studied as such.  Today’s law students are the 
better for it; they have a more realistic, as well as far 
richer, understanding of law as a consequence than 
did their counterparts in Langdell’s classrooms.  
Nevertheless, the added sophistication that comes 
from interdisciplinarity does not in any obvious or 
automatic way contribute to the articulation of what 
a lawyer is or should be, or what education a student 
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should have to become one.  It does not, that is, fill 
the gap left by our rejection of the Langdellian 
understanding of the lawyer as a member of a 
learned profession immersed in the study of the 
common law.  We simply have not articulated such a 
post-Langdellian conception, and all the 
interdisciplinary studies in the world on the nature 
of law, rather than lawyering, will not imply one: we 
will not have one, that is, until we have a faculty 
committed to producing one, and acting on it.167 
West attributes the cause of this hesitancy to jump ship to some 
other vessel of teaching to a lack of faculty perspective collectively 
on the teaching of law students—a missing “post-Langdellian 
conception”168—and not an academic perspective of law’s nature, 
which as West criticizes is what students receive from modern 
law courses.169  The implication of hanging on to the traditions 
and practices of law teaching is how inappropriate or effective the 
current conception is for training lawyers.170  In other instances, 
West has identified in her own words how the use of the case 
method leads to problematic objectifications of law, illustrating 
how the propagation of Langdell’s case method leads to legalism 
that distracts from serious engagement with the idea that law can 
further justice.171  Her arguments on whether or not law ought to 
further justice and how such notions should be taught to law 
students buttresses her own specialized imperative that law 
schools must move toward a post-Langdellian conception.172  
Nevertheless, she is correct to diagnose that a post-Langdellian 
conception is amiss in legal education even though more than a 
century of American legal history has passed since the decline of 
Langdell’s concept of law as science.   
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Others have concurred with West.173  Part III will examine 
more implications of this incongruity between American legal 
pedagogy and history.     
III.THE CASE METHOD & OBJECTIFICATION OF THE LAW 
In observing the historical movements of American 
jurisprudence, one need not search far and wide for criticisms 
that the nature of the law is ever slow-moving in comparison to 
advances in social reality.  Such criticisms emerge rather easily 
after a cursory search.  Whether scholarly observations of lag and 
sluggishness have been used to describe progress of certain bodies 
of law174 or the entirety of jurisprudence itself,175 one consensus is 
that “the legal system was peculiarly slow to reflect changes in 
the larger culture, partly because of the specialized nature of the 
legal profession and partly because of the investment of 
professionals in the status quo.”176  Similarly, as law’s 
derivatives, the legal profession and legal education both embody 
comparable rhythms toward progress.  Like progress in law, 
“[a]dmittedly, change often comes rather slowly to legal 
education; after all, the law has always tended to be a backward-
looking profession.”177  Resistance is more often the norm.  
Conflated together, all of these remarks about the behavior of law 
and lawyers prompts one to ask in the context of the legal 
profession whether lawyers as pessimists tend to persist in 
orthodoxy more than they would if they were more collectively 
optimists.178    
At first, Langdell’s reforms at Harvard Law School were 
not exempt from resisters.  Early in his period of pedagogical 
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innovations at Harvard, the introduction and use of the case 
method in the classroom met some staunch reluctance from both 
legal educators and the bar alike.  The account in Centennial 
History of Harvard Law School, which attributed the case method 
to Landgell, recounted that “to most of the students, as well as to 
Langdell’s colleagues, [the case method] was an abomination.”179  
More specifically, “ ‘[h]is attempts were met with the open 
hostility, if not of the other instructors, certainly of the bulk of the 
students.  His first lectures were followed by impromptu 
indignation meetings. — “What do we care whether Myers agrees 
with the case, or what Fessenden thinks of the dissenting 
opinion? What we want to know is: ‘What’s the law?’ ” ’ ”180  The 
contemporary bar had its harsh skepticisms:  “Practitioners had 
always had some doubts about the case method, both 
intellectually and politically.  As early as 1876 the Central Law 
Journal had condemned the system ‘which we understand to 
involve a wide and somewhat indiscriminating reading of cases—
some of them overruled.’ ”181  The editors of the Central Law 
Journal had expressly disclaimed any approval of the case 
method.182   They also noted how the rise of the case method 
pedagogy had “excited great and bitter controversy” that led to 
the establishment of the law school at Boston University.”183  The 
allusion to a certain underlying concern or fear for how the 
profession might be perceived seemed to lurk beneath the surface 
of the Journal’s observations:   
The strength of our impressions is that the reading 
of carefully selected judgments of the courts, could in 
a course of study, profitably be made subsidiary to 
the attending of lectures and the study of approved 
textbooks; but we doubt the wisdom of the relying on 
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case-reading to the extent to which, as we 
understand it, Prof. Langdell’s system goes.184 
This possible prediction that the law would be subjugated 
resembles the tension against the trade night-school law schools 
that sprang in the early 20th century to accommodate ethnic 
minorities who wanted to attend law schools and enter into the 
profession but were more or less excluded from the learned 
classes at law schools such as Harvard.  It seemed more 
politically motivated than accurate.  In fact, the trade school 
model was inconsistent with Langell’s intentions for starting the 
use of the case method at Harvard; he had intended the case 
method to elevate the legal studies, not automatize it.     
True to effect, however, the journal editors got it right that 
students would skip his classes.  In the first term of introducing 
the case method, Langdell’s “students were bewildered; they cut 
Langdell’s classes in droves, only a few remained to hear him 
out.”185  By the end, the class was left to seven students—
devotees who were then known as “Kit’s Freshmen” or “Langdell’s 
Freshman.”186  But students had not left because they decided 
they could “wing” the learning of critical lawyering skills on their 
own.  More likely Langdell’s students left because they could not 
find the relevance of what Langdell taught through his case 
method—“overruled” decisions. 187    
Inadvertently or otherwise, Joseph Beale echoed this 
irrelevancy when he recounted that Langdell’s law “sometimes 
seemed too academic; and many of his students said, if they did 
not really feel, that his teaching was magnificent, but was not 
law”188—particularly as Langdell called English cases by Lord 
Hardwick “comparatively recent” and “was believed to regard 
modern decisions as beneath his notice.”189  The peculiar 
academic nature of Langdell’s classroom teaching proved to be 
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pedantic:  “The dialogues in Langdell’s classes went slowly, and 
covered very little ground, compared to the lecture method.”190  
As an immediate reaction, colleagues at Harvard returned to 
their previous methods of law teaching.191   
Of course, eventually, the case method became the status 
quo that the legal academy heavily invested.192  In 1906, James 
Ames, dean of the Harvard Law School from 1895 to 1910, and 
who has received some attribution regarding the popularizing of 
the case method, remarked that “the most fruitful change of all 
was the revolution effected by Langdell in the mode of teaching 
and studying law,—a revolution now so complete that most 
persons hear with surprise that, when his ‘Cases on Contracts,’ 
was first used, his disciples were a mere handful and known as 
‘Landgell’s freshmen,’ a name given as a term of reproach but 
received as a title of honor[.]”193  Ames had been one of those 
seven freshmen.194  Perhaps this artifact was truly why Ames was 
hyperbolic in sentiment when he paid Langdell his tributes in 
1906, upon Langdell’s death, by saying that “[i]n the last ten 
years [Landgell’s] method has conquered its way into a majority 
of American law schools”195 and that “it is a constant satisfaction 
that his man of genius was permitted to see his views dominating 
legal education throughout the United States.”196  But in terms of 
the case method, “the leading universities had ‘received the faith’ 
by 1891,”197 and “[u]ltimately, every major and most minor law 
schools converted to case-books and the Socratic method.”198  In 
large part, the method’s success was due to a gradual ability for 
law schools aspiring for prominence in the university setting to 
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use it to reflect conformance to a growing elitist trend that had 
started at Harvard.199       
To be sure, some have observed positive attributes and 
consequences for using the case method.  There were financial 
benefits and efficiencies.  As Robert Stevens has observed, “[t]he 
vast success of Langdell’s method enabled the establishment of a 
large-size class.”200  Specifically, under Langdell’s deanship at 
Harvard, the case method allowed a class of 75 students to be led 
by one faculty member: “Its Socratic aspect justified the 
abandonment of the recitation and the quiz, the ‘exercises’ used at 
good schools relying on the lecture method.”201  The economics 
established by this new faculty-student ratio meant less 
expensive courses to run at Harvard; indeed, “[a]ny educational 
program or innovation that allowed one man to teach even more 
students was not unwelcome to university administrators.  The 
‘Harvard method of instruction’ meant that law schools could be 
self-supporting.”202  This self-substance seemed attractive to law 
schools. 
In terms of pedagogical benefits, others have identified 
them in the case method as well.  Approached by the Carnegie 
Foundation in 1913 to evaluate the case method in American law 
schools, German law professor, Josef Redlich,203 wrote in his 
resulting report that the case method was more analytically 
demanding for the law student over the older textbook method:   
Consequently as the [case method] was developed, it 
laid the main emphasis precisely upon that aspect of 
the training which the older text-book school entirely 
neglected: the training of the student in intellectual 
independence, in individual thinking, in digging out 
the principles through penetrating analysis of the 
material found within separate cases:  material 
which contains, all mixed in with one another, both 
the facts, as life creates them, which generate the 
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law, and at the same time rules of the law itself, 
component parts of the general system.  In the fact 
that, as has been said before, it has actually 
accomplished this purpose, lies the great success of 
the case method.204   
Redlich also qualified his praise by noting his hesitancy with the 
case method’s embodiments of a scientific conception of law, 
calling the heavy analogy between law and science 
“inaccurate”205—and by regarding the nature of American law, as 
driven by common law practices, to have buoyed the case 
method’s success.206    
On similar evaluations of praise as Redlich, others have 
dived further into observations of the case method’s analytical 
demand.  Paul Carrington offered a catalogue of benefits that 
observed the case method’s capability to foster mental discipline 
and independent habits of learning the law,207 its development of 
lawyerly judgment,208 its helpful comprehension of common law 
traditions,209 its promotion of moral consciousness, 210 and its 
narrative power to draw attention.211  In commenting about 
Carrington’s indicated list of benefits, Judith Welch Wegner has 
questioned “whether these benefits are directly attributable to the 
‘case method’ or to the use of the ‘Socratic method’ of questioning 
in conjunction with the study of cases, as discussed below.”212  
Regardless of this distinction, Welch then considered that to 
Carrington’s list  
other benefits might be added: the potential for 
development of ‘deep knowledge,’ the chance to 
participate in the ‘construction’ of knowledge that 
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fosters memory and self-confidence, the opportunity 
to teach about the legal process and lawyering as 
well as about how to read cases and engage in 
critical analysis, the power of learning in an 
authentic context that resembles at least to some 
degree the actual practice setting, and the 
educational force of gaining certainty in the face of 
pre-existing doubt.213  
In likewise fashion, Russell Weaver has also noted how the heavy 
emphasis of cases factually contextualizes the legal situations for 
students and “stimulate greater student interest” than reading 
summaries of legal issues from a textbook.214  Similarly to 
Carrington, Weaver also noted how the case method teaches 
students how to dissect the different parts of a case opinion,215 
facilitates learning of critical analysis by compelling in-class 
inquiry into cases,216 develops mental “toughness” and quick 
thinking skills,217 allows learning law in a precedent-driven 
system,218 imparts comprehension of a legal process that is 
inductive,219 and instructs upon the functions of a lawyer.220  
Others have echoed Carrington, Welch, and Weaver’s emphases 
that the case method promotes critical and intellectual rigor.221 
 Of course, opposing views about the method also exist—and 
in plenty form.  Specific criticisms, particularly from law faculty, 
over the pedagogical side effects of Langdell’s case method have 
always persisted—criticisms that echo the contemporary scrutiny 
of the method during Langdell’s days at Harvard, but also ones 
that dip deeper into its murky waters to uncover more of its 
shortcomings and treachery.  Never mind Jerome Frank’s 
unflattering criticisms about the case method in the 1930s, which 
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asserted inter alia, that under the case method, students “do not 
study cases” truly as the method had claimed,222 that [s]tudents 
trained under the Langdell system are like future horticulturists 
confining their studies to cut flowers,”223 and that the method’s 
most profound “fault is in its naïve assumption of the inviolability 
of the stare decisis doctrine and its corollaries.”224 Or one could 
forgo for now, Grant Gilmore’s later acerbic indictments in the 
1970s, noting that “[a]t least in Langdell’s version, [the case 
method] had nothing whatever to do with getting students to 
think for themselves; it was, on the contrary, a method of 
indoctrination through brainwashing.”225  In tone, both Frank 
and Gilmore’s twentieth-century remarks seemed to rail against 
the widespread acceptance of the case method, trying to arouse 
mutiny in the academy by flinging contempt for Langdell and his 
method into the air.  And according to John Schlegel’s passing 
quip, uncovered in Bruce Kimball’s relatively recent 
historiography on Christopher Langdell, Grant Gilmore might 
have succeeded.226  But aside from Frank, Gilmore, and the 
trashing of the Langdellian method for the sake of mutiny (or 
even just the sake of trashing it), the crux of some of the negative 
insights toward the Langdellian case method points to its 
categorical failing to teach law in its entirety—that the pedagogy 
is propped with the purpose to accomplish too much, and as a 
result, has assumed too much.227  Redlich alluded to this problem 
when he wrote that a result of the case method as the dominant 
way of teaching law in American law schools is that “the students 
never obtain a general picture of the law as a whole, not even a 
picture which includes only its main features.”228  The teaching of 
principles and doctrines under common law through the case 
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method was “being most excellently performed” at the law schools 
that Redlich observed but that did not mean, in his opinion, that 
instruction on other traditions and points of the law were being 
accomplished.229  Grant Gilmore, aside from tone, made a similar 
statement that the case method’s effect was a type of suppression 
of the actual state and history of the law:   
Since 1800 the principal characteristics of American 
law had been its chaotic diversity, its sensitivity to 
changing conditions, its fluidity, its pluralism.  All 
that had to be suppressed. . . . It is also fair to say 
that the Langdellians, both in their casebooks and 
their treatises, performed major surgery on what 
their chosen English cases had been about when 
they were real cases in a real England.  England 
became our never-never land, our Shangri-Law, our 
Utopia.230   
Law was a distortion and the method reflected this distortion—a 
method that was then used to teach law in American law schools.  
Therein the ironies of a presumed completeness, unity, and 
autonomy in a method with shortcomings emerge. 
 Three decades ago, Duncan Kennedy explored the social 
and political ramifications of that distortion on American law 
students.231  In his memorable crit-laden fashion, Kennedy 
claimed how law school itself as an ideology, a sentiment that 
implies his views on the distortion of law, which made clearer 
sense when he unpacked the consequences of seeing that ideology 
for what it was:      
   To say that law school is ideological is to say that 
what teachers teach along with basic skills is wrong, 
is nonsense about what law is and how it works; that 
the message about the nature of legal competence, 
and its distribution among students is wrong, is 
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nonsense; that the ideas about the possibilities of life 
as a lawyer that students pick up from legal 
education are wrong, are nonsense.232  
Seemingly echoing Gilmore’s claim of “indoctrination by 
brainwashing” but going even deeper, Kennedy illustrated how 
the distortion had been embedded as the status quo of American 
law schools and its ensuing effects on law students: 
Because students believe what they are told, 
explicitly and implicitly, about the world they are 
entering, they behave in ways that fulfill the 
prophecies the system makes about them and about 
that world.  This is the linkback that completes the 
system: students do more than accept the way things 
are, and ideology does more than damp opposition.233 
Kennedy’s reflections on the distortion of law were just as 
scathing as Gilmore’s; for instance, the Socratic dialogue was 
characterized as “pseudoparticipation.”234  But his lengthier 
ruminations drew out more clearly than Gilmore the distortion’s 
profound potency and harm.  From an examination of what takes 
place in the typical Socratic dialogue, “[i]t quickly emerges that 
neither the students nor the faculty are as homogeneous as they 
at first appeared.”235  That striation, undemocratic at its core in 
Kennedy’s description, appears as ominous and tense as those 
moments in a horror flick when recent converts to a destructive 
cult recognizes that they’ve been had—and not in a good way.  
But in Kennedy’s version, the converts continue to perpetuate the 
hierarchy; they continue the path of becoming lawyers, up the 
ranks of profession to eventually steer the industry and field.   
 Simultaneously, Kennedy criticized the case method for 
falsifying both the intellectualism of the law and the practice of 
lawyering.  As for how the case method presented intellectualism 
of the law, Kennedy found it to be underwhelming:  “The actual 
intellectual content of the law seems to consist of learning rules—
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what they are and why they have to be the way they are—while 
rooting for the occasional judge who seems willing to make them 
marginally more humane.”236  Was that all there was to the law—
just these rules, likely from cases, and some hope for a meager 
judicial morality?  Kennedy’s reference to Langdell’s inductive 
legal science here is glaring.  Yet, the case method distorts more 
than that—particularly in regards to lawyering.  Skills are taught 
under the case method, but taught in a twisted “mystified” way 
that obscures what skills and lawyering are.  Like others before 
him, Kennedy contended that the case method substituted 
notions of lawyering wholesale with the false primacy of inductive 
legal reasoning by noting how under the case method, “law 
emerges from a rigorous analytical procedure called legal 
reasoning”237—one which is “unintelligible to the layperson but 
somehow both explains and validates the great majority of the 
rules in force in our system.”238  His remark here connected the 
proverbial “thinking like a lawyer” (legal reasoning) with the idea 
of law’s completion (Langdell’s formalism), and served up an 
underhanded swipe at the case method’s inductive reasoning.  
Then he attacked the content of law courses.  Specifically, he 
noted how the law courses segregated each legal doctrine issue “a 
tub on its own bottom” misled students from learning “an 
integrating vision of what law is, how it works, or how it might be 
changed (other than in any incremental, case-by-case, reformist 
way).”239  That isolation parallels the isolation between legal 
reasoning and lawyering that Kennedy found was what law 
schools perpetrated, again distorting what law and lawyering 
was:  “ ‘Legal reasoning’ is sharply distinguished from law 
practice, and one learns nothing about practice.”240  The 
consequence ultimately “disables” students from the profession.241   
 The curricular holdovers from Langdell also perturbed 
Kennedy.  Recapitulating on the “tubs on their own bottoms” 
motif, Kennedy criticized the segregation of law courses, 
particularly in the first-year curriculum, as a deliberate, 
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intentional set of separations242 that distorted the reality of 
law.243  He observed that peripheral subjects, such as philosophy 
of law, history of law, legal process, and law clinical courses, that 
give context to the law were not readily taught as part of the core 
curriculum because law schools, preferring inductive reasoning, 
perceived these other courses as not promoting the “ ‘hard’ 
objective, serious, rigorous analytic core of law.”244  Instead, law 
schools trivialized these contextual courses as more or less 
cosmetic, part of the “finishing school for learning the social art of 
self-presentation as a lawyer.”245  In this respect, Kennedy here 
seemed to echo Redlich’s hesitancy more than a half-century 
earlier in regards to the case method’s heavy emphasis of 
analytical rigor over teaching the context of law—except unlike 
Redlich, who was a German outside observer hired by the 
Carnegie Foundation, Kennedy was observing as an insider, from 
within the American legal academy (Harvard, no less), long after 
Langdell’s case method had become the status quo.   
Kennedy lamented for an alternative:  “A more rational 
system would emphasize to way to learn law rather than rules, 
and skills rather than answers.  Student capacities would be 
more equal as a result, but students would also be radically more 
flexible in what they could do in practice.”246  He hinted at how 
the distortion of law through the case method achieved disparity 
in the way the Langdellian set-up in law schools created a setting 
for “enforced cultural uniformity.”247  If the analytical, inductive 
rigor of “thinking like a lawyer” has been the categorical 
substitute or proxy for what the law was or what lawyers did—or 
at least how law schools have used it since Langdell—and if the 
reason for inductive reasoning relied on Langdell’s original beliefs 
in the completeness, unity, and autonomy of the common law, 
then the idea of what was law and how to uncover and study it 
under the case method was like what Redlich had said, 
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“inaccurate.”  A more “realistic” idea of law has been siphoned off 
only to be reflected by a peculiarly small and limited set of 
behaviors that served to reinforce a distorted idea of the norm.  
The cultural implications were significant here as Kennedy 
illustrated how that small set of behaviors end up fetishized at 
the top of a hierarchy that appeared oppressive, especially to 
diverse law students.248   What the case method did with its 
distortion of law was to develop in law students “skills that 
incapacitate rather than empower, skills that will help you 
imprison yourself in practice.”249 The minority law student 
learned that the skill of assimilation was the oar of survival.250  
Meanwhile, everyone who entered the system “accept[ed] the 
system’s presentation of itself as largely neutral, as apolitical, 
meritocratic, instrumental, a matter of craft,” even though the 
reality of law was not that way.251  Not only was the outcome a 
grim one for legal education as the pedagogy installed as the 
status quo was based on a distortion of law, but what was worse 
in Kennedy’s was that it fostered dispassion, detachment, 
disengagement, and disenchantment with the law.252    
 Kennedy is not alone in being political and socially critical 
of the case method as well.  Commentators have also attacked the 
case method’s blindness toward a plurality of learning styles and 
capacities in students.253  Accordingly, in this vein, some have 
also emphasized how the case method fetishizes abstract 
reasoning over a more inclusive set of critical lawyering skills.254  
Others have examined the psychological aspects of the case 
method and even unflatteringly portrayed aspects of it as 
“infantilizing, demeaning, dehumanizing, sadistic, a tactic for 
promoting hostility and competition among students, self-serving, 
                                                 
248 Id. at 70. 
249 Id.  
250 See, e.g., id.  
251 Id. at 72. 
252 Id. at 73. 
253  Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case 
Against the Case System?, 36 J. Legal Educ. 167, 185 (1986). 
254  See, e.g., Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of 
Traditional Law School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 
449 (1996). 
46                       LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY                  [Vol. __ 
  
and destructive of positive ideological values.”255 Scholars have 
also observed that the way law schools teach the law exhaults 
cold, hard doctrine over the “human aspects of lawyering—
variously called empathetic, affective, feeling, altruistic, and 
service aspects of lawyering.”256 Even more incisively, other 
scholars have bemoaned that the case method’s sole weight on 
appellate opinions obscures the importance of doctrinal analysis 
to the exclusion of fact analysis in law practice, which can 
arguably shift the emphasis away from doctrine.257 
In her existential assessment of law schools, Robin West 
sees the case method’s distortion-dispassion correlation as 
harboring serious implications for teaching justice in law schools.  
West differs from others who link the case method to 
amoralism.258 Instead, she finds that contemporary American 
legal education produces in a legalist way of engaging in the law 
that is due to the sense of processual fairness students pick up in 
case method reasoning starting in the first year and in the 
method’s preference for performing horizontal equity, of treating 
like cases alike.259  Again, the case method’s artificial and 
distorted placement of analytical rigor as superior lies at the 
heart of this conditioning of law students.  Coupled with the 
legacy of Langdellian formalism that still remains, the result, as 
West maintains, marginalizes the thoughts and teachings on 
justice that bodes terribly for instilling a normative sense of 
jurisprudence in law students.260   
 These scholarly and critical observations about the case 
method largely target the distortion of law behind the method.  It 
has not been hard for scholars to surmise that behind the 
distortion reflected in the case method rests the mandate of 
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Langdellian nineteenth-century formalism to objectify law, 
according to its late nineteenth-century virtues.  To see larger, 
more damaging implications in that objectification of law, 
postmodernist critiques of Langdellian formalism offers such 
implications for contemporary legal education that are even more 
basic and fundamental than the disconnect between teaching law 
and justice that West had indicated.              
 As a tradition or condition of thought accentuated and 
effected by questions of instability, postmodern experiences of the 
law have challenged modernist conceptions of law for embedding 
assumptions and establishments of objective and complete unity 
in the law as part of a goal of legal modernists to find objective 
truth in reality.261  In this way, to juxtapose Langdellian 
formalism next to postmodernism allows us to see—from a 
phenomenological way, and even perhaps in an exaggerated 
way—the trappings of the conception of law as science:  “What 
postmodernists do is intensify dissatisfaction with the narrowness 
of professional knowledge about law.”262  Specifically, postmodern 
jurisprudence’s obsession with the politics of form and the concept 
of the subjective in law has much to say about Langdellian 
formalism.  While Langdell’s formalism perpetuated certain 
ideals about law—its completeness, autonomy, neutrality, etc.—
and reinforced those ideals through its form—the case method—
to the point of objectifying the law as its own living, breathing 
entity,  postmodernism critiques the gaps in that endeavor, 
noting that underneath the sorcery the ideals and norms are 
never that neutral, complete, or objective. 
 Most notably, the politics of form and the concept of 
subjectivity in postmodern legal thought has focused on the 
missing subject in Langdellian conception of law and its 
associated problems.263  According to postmodernist thought, 
Langdell’s legal conception of law as science objectified law in a 
way that hid its first human author, Langdell, and its subsequent 
authors as well.264  As Pierre Schlag has observed, much of this 
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veiling or “effacement” of the author was effectuated through 
ritualized rhetoric of the law as well as the act of inductive legal 
reasoning.265  Taking his contracts casebook as a prime example, 
Schlag notes how Langdell interchanges authorial viewpoints 
depending on whether he was writing about the law or whether 
he was writing about pedagogy:   
Whenever Chris [Langdell] addresses a matter of 
pedagogy in his preface, the “I” is all over the place.  
And yet, quite mysteriously, as soon as the law 
makes its appearance in the preface, the “I” 
vanishes.  Chris disappears.  Dean Langdell is 
removed.  Even you, the reader, begin to experience 
a certain ego loss.  Could it be God?  Is it love?  No, 
it’s law—law and science: ‘Law, considered as a 
science, consists of certain principles or doctrines . . . 
.266           
Ritualized and repeated in this way, the law as voiced and 
written by Langdellian formalists loses its authors and instead 
the impression is that “Contract law does things; the rules speak, 
the doctrine evolves and develops” and “[m]odern legal scholars 
have since followed Langdell’s example; accounts of the subject 
are rare in contemporary legal scholarship because subjectivity is 
sublimated in legal forms and because only certain kinds of 
subjects can be vested in these legal forms.”267  As Gary Minda 
seems to suggest, the Langdellian vision of legal science 
encouraged this mimicry—“to write in the passive voice and to 
rigorously maintain the detached demeanor of a scientist 
conducting a controlled experiment”268—which have resulted 
experiences of the law by modern legal scholars that have been 
“somehow ‘constrained’ and ‘bounded’ by law’s professional 
method of analysis and orientation.”269  What is worse is the lie of 
disengagement:  “And, yet, in removing their subjective presence 
from their discussion of the law, modern legal scholars have also 
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assumed that they are capable of excluding their own personal 
subjective identities from their work.”  They “assume, in other 
words, that they are becoming relatively empty, abstract, and 
universal subjects-in-control of the law.”270  The problem with this 
ritualized uniformity and passivity that tries to embody a 
mimicry of the scientific, as Minda implies, is that all of this 
falsity, pretense, and subordination trickles down to professional 
inculcation, which is what law schools are tasked to do:  “Hence, 
the expression ‘thinking like a lawyer’ makes sense because it is 
thought that all lawyers think alike.’ ”271   
 The established ritual of rhetoric of legal reasoning not 
only subordinates its subjects but also its act of concealing 
through language and the overshadowing of subjects by the 
objectification of law makes any inquiries about that author 
difficult to achieve.  Here is how that emphasis of inductive legal 
reasoning creates this hermetic problem as it contributes to the 
objectification of law and at the same time minimizing the 
subject:  “Legal rules are explained, analyzed, and criticized as if 
they were transcendental objects unaffected by analyzing 
subjects.”272  These attributes of rhetoric and reasoning under 
Langdell is the crux of a popularlized formalist style.273  In this 
way, the law achieves objectification because “the law is a 
transcendental object unaffected by social and economic 
context”274 and the result is prevention “from confronting the 
hidden assumption of the autonomous legal subject.”275 
 But postmodernism has uncovered the subject in law as 
anything but an autonomous being.  When the reveal is made 
that “the subject is a problem,” the thought leads to a “serious 
predicament” for legal scholars because the reality is that “[t]here 
are many different subjects who interpret the law.”276  So how 
does one talk about the law or justify the law as transcendental, 
neutral, complete, and autonomous when “the meaning of law 
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depends on the various constructions of different subjects”?277  
The identities of the “subjects-in-control of the law” matter.278  
What we are left with is the reality that law is “man-made,” not 
its own living scientific entity that reflects universal truths of the 
world, but something that reflects humanity—and undoubtedly 
has reflected a certain kind of humanity, even under Langdell’s 
order.279  Meanwhile, we do not have a language for articulating 
the law in this way, nor a reference point for this more realistic or 
truthful point of view about law.  This predicament is debilitating 
for legal scholars because it makes them confront subjectivity.  
Likewise as the politics of form and subordination of the 
self/subject is reflected in the case method through the same 
rhetoric and legal reasoning, the predicament is also 
debilitating—or couched in Duncan Kennedy’s terms, 
“disabling”—because in its continued use of the case method with 
its objectification and distortions of law, law schools pass these 
same problems about the subject in law to their students.280         
 According to postmodernism, this dispassionate, 
disengaged version of law and its case method subverts the 
human in law by concealing subjectivity through it rhetoric and 
formalist style and emphasizing an idealized, legalistic 
objectivity.  The lack of focus on the subject—in the context of law 
school, students—and the lie that the subject does not exist has 
serious ramifications.  “Langdellian formalism reduces the subject 
to a subordinate trivial role, the performance of that trivial role 
remains essential to the ‘reading’ of the object order of law.”281  If 
that is the case, then American legal education is floating on an 
ineffectual life raft on waters now revealed to be deeper and more 
treacherous than we have known.  Its methodology is irrelevant 
and disempowering.   
Yet, even with such postmodernist commentary nearly two 
decades ago, American law schools continue to rely on 
Langdellian pedagogy.  Since even the realists, the academy has 
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long-recognized Langdellian conception of law as science as 
having some virtues but altogether unencompassing as a way to 
study and develop law, but still the shell of the case method traps 
law schools from progressing forward.   
 Prior to the recent crisis of legal education, Edward Rubin, 
in a critical stance against the Langdell case method, 
hypothesized reasons why the case method still persisted in law 
schools, despite its outdatedness.282  He had listed that the case 
method’s “very obsolescence” had engendered an appearance of its 
“immutability” so hard that “it seems less a tradition than a fact 
of nature.”283  First, the boat seems hard to rock.  Additionally, 
Rubin observed that the complacency created by the fiscal 
powerhouses of law schools as money makers for universities and 
law faculty members as beneficiaries reduce any competing urge 
to change the status quo.284  Now there’s reluctance to rock the 
boat.  And finally, Rubin offers one more reason that law schools 
have kept the case method, which in part is self-defeating:  
faculty members at law schools tend to read “a false appearance 
of modernity” into the case method.285  In staying on the boat and 
not rocking it, we tell ourselves that the boat is truly state-of-the-
art in order to justify continual refrain from rocking the boat.  
“Our failure to progress paints the Langdellian original with false 
colors of modernity, misleading us into thinking that the 
rationales for his curriculum correspond to our current 
understanding of law, society, and education.”286    
 Ten years has passed since Rubin’s observations.  At least 
one of his proffered justifications—the fiscal health and financial 
stability of law schools—is no longer quite the case because of the 
current and recent crisis of legal education.  They are, borrowing 
another of Duncan Kennedy’s phrases, quite the fiscal “tubs on 
their own bottoms” as they might have been.287  With that prong 
no longer true, justification for keeping the case method afloat in 
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contemporary American law schools seems even more uncertain—
especially if the only reasons are the first and third ones that 
Rubin mentioned.  In an updated but still critical view about the 
future of legal education in 2014, Rubin has given two trends in 
society that may propel changes in legal education whether law 
schools like it or not.288  First is the rise of a knowledge-based 
economy, in which “the increasing complexity of society in 
general” and “legal expertise, as knowledge, . . . more central to 
the sources of wealth in that new economy” will require a 
restructuring of law schools that may include additional years 
and intensity of instruction.289  Currently, because law schools 
still “retain[] an approach to pedagogy developed before Dewy, 
Piaget, Montessori, and all the other founds of twentieth-century 
education theory,” they “teach at the same level of specificity in 
all three years.  In effect, they are teaching three years of second-
year courses.”290  Instead, Rubin suggest a graduated approach 
where the first year is “more introductory and foundational” and 
the third year is more interactive and advanced so that it “give[s] 
students an opportunity to work in a more participatory and 
interactive manner and to investigate one area of law in more 
detail.”291  The result is more subjectivity, empowering, and 
relevance in learning law and practice so that students “develop 
an appreciation for the complexity of modern law and an 
understanding of the ways to deal with, and take advantage of 
that complexity.”292      
 Another concerning trend that Rubin examines is the 
teaching of social justice in law schools:  “The second major social 
trend that is directly relevant to legal education is the ongoing 
demand, both moral and political, for social justice.”293  The 
relevance is two-fold.  First, intertwined with the knowledge 
revolution is the rising need for “people to enforce their 
traditional rights to the new products that our knowledge-based 
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economy is producing.”294  Technology’s drive to complexity in life 
will translate to protection and enforcement of individual rights 
whether in private commercial law or criminal law.295  Secondly, 
such advancements and corresponding legal services will need to 
be equally distributed and accessible to avoid social injustice.296  
But for now, “[t]he challenge is that the law school curriculum, in 
its present form, is designed to train students to provide legal 
services to corporations, wealthy individuals, and prosperous 
small-town elites, not to the working classes or the 
underprivileged.”297  Rubin’s fault with the Langdellian method 
here, in the realm of teaching justice, is similar to Robin Wests’ 
dissatisfaction.  Others in the academic have similarly observed 
justice teaching as a goal of contemporary law schools.298   
Rubin’s reasons for changing legal education and pedagogy 
should prompt concern.  But if the fundamental pedagogy of law 
schools detaches the student from the law in the way that the 
commentators above have described in service of a model of law 
that overly objectifies and distorts the reality of the law and the 
control and instrumentality of the law, then how do law schools 
expect to empower their students to be capable legal thinkers, as 
well as stay relevant to the actual nature of the law?  Are law 
schools just drifting on by, and is there a conception that could 
support a new pedagogy? Part IV will introduce one concept that 
seeks to address these issues.    
IV. THE INSTRUMENTALITY CONCEPTION 
To merely reconfigure the case method is to engender 
further justifications for the method’s continuing use and legacy 
in American legal education.  Consequently, the solution in this 
Part IV charts more fundamentally toward creating a 
contemporary conceptualization of law rather than transplanting 
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the practices of the Langdellian method into new waters—
essentially allowing it to linger afloat in American law schools for 
educating and influencing further generations of lawyers.299  The 
intent here is to broaden and change existing pedagogical 
traditions by conjuring the topic of law school study and inquiry—
that is, law—in ways beyond the system of a nineteenth-century 
scientific legal paradigm in hopes to avoid the kind of 
objectification discussed in Parts II & III, supra, and to bring the 
Subject (or Subjects) of law explicitly into the study of it.  To 
arrive at this solution requires finding one underlying conception 
of law—not necessary an all-encompassing one, but a conception 
that will generate newer and less constricting ways to teach law 
and lawyering, a conception that is less empirical and hopefully 
less arrogant in its ambitions, one that can better facilitate 
pluralism while focusing on relevance and empowerment.  This 
task is possible if we stop trying to categorize what law is in a 
formalist way and instead begin examining and working with its 
characteristics, inherent aesthetics, and effects.  Thusly, the idea 
of “law as instrumentality” seeks to do so in this manner.  
Previous portions of this Article have inferred and explored 
the fallacies of categorizing law as a unified body and how that 
distortion seeps into pedagogical methods with critically 
undesirable results.  In part, the movements of American legal 
thought that have followed Langdellian formalism—from 
American legal realism to postmodernism—have exposed such 
fallacies by their separate reactions to the assumption of law’s 
complete unity and autonomy.300  Each movement, in its own 
thought, has identified gaps to the law that defy unity.301  Such 
observations could indicate either that these gaps exist in a 
present state of modernism or that the modernist moment has 
been entirely superseded by post-modernity.302  Both possible 
observations suggest that achieving unity in law is ultimately 
impossible.303  To know this truth of the matter, but to continue 
preoccupying over unity and autonomy is debilitating after a 
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while—especially if that while has lasted for more than a century.  
Why then, other than intellectual and academic complacency,304 
do we still justify teaching only a limited set of ways to treat the 
law by adhering to a pedagogy that embraces those fallacies?  
Despite our modern considerations and presumptions of law and 
its practices, why are we still setting sails to chase after a 
mythical beast in the ocean in the way Langdell had once chased?   
Conversely, studying law under a concept of its 
instrumentality does not send out students to uncover a singular 
unitary body of law only to watch them crash on rocky shores.  
Law is not a mythical beast lurking out in the high seas for hunt.  
Borrowing from Gertrude Stein, “there is no there there” in that 
endeavor; no beast of that mythos awaits our capture, but only 
intellectual cruelty in its mandate and the high possibilities of 
being led off-course, of academic ship-wrecks, and rumors 
transmitted across the high seas about legal education’s demise.   
Instead, there are qualities existing in law and its practices 
that prompt and beckon exploration.  When we experience the 
law, we experience its characteristics and effects.305  Studying 
and teaching law by starting with its instrumentalities is one way 
of accessing the inquiry into law and the various qualities and 
characteristics of its agency without the prerequisite of a ritual 
established by the case method that is no longer justified by 
Langdellian formalism. 
A. Etymology and Ontology 
In law, the word “instrumentality” has its resident usage 
and definitions, but both its technical uses and meanings reveal 
some degree of instability as well.  Under Black’s Law Dictionary, 
“instrumentality” is defined as primarily “[a] thing used to 
achieve an end or purpose”306 and then secondarily “a means or 
agency through which a function of another entity is 
accomplished, such as a branch of a governing body.”307  The word 
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has its anchors in several different bodies of law, and both 
primary and secondary meanings appear readily in usage.  In tort 
law, “instrumentality” appears in res ipsa loquitor and strict 
liability cases and doctrines, typically serving as strawman or 
proxy for broadly describing the harmful conduct or items that a 
tortious actor can control to set in motion.308  In the law of 
business associations, instrumentality appears in the corporate 
veil doctrine as the “thing” that corporate actors use to shield 
their illicit activities behind the legal entity.309  In the criminal 
context, the Earl Warren majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio310 
penned the phrase, “instrumentalities of the crime,” in part, to 
describe items directed in the act of police stop and frisk.311  Of 
course, more seemingly benign uses of “instrumentality” exist, for 
instance, in federal statutory guidelines where “instrumentality” 
could be a state or private agency312 and, of course, in 
employment law in the realm of entrustment and agency.313  The 
word in its current legal usage does not appear in some modern 
legal dictionaries such as those reaching back to the late 
nineteenth or early twentieth centuries—for instance, Irving 
Browne’s Common Words and Phrases (1883) or the 8th edition of 
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1914).  However, in English law, 
“instrumentality” is listed in F. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary 
(1903):  “[A] Solicitor is entitled to a charge for his costs on 
property recovered or preserved through his ‘instrumentality.’ ”314  
Stroud’s specifically references the use of “instrumentality” in an 
1885 Chancery opinion by an English court that referred to the 
agency of an attorney and his work.315  From the examples above 
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and others, we can see that the term embodies a degree of 
instability and malleability, appearing in both public and private 
areas of law; as a business entity or commercial activity; or a 
dangerous item or an item in use of perpetrating a crime; as an 
item possible of being controlled and used for a purpose.  The 
word, “instrumental,” at the root of “instrumentality,” helps to 
connote usefulness or qualities in furthering a purpose316 and 
ultimately connects “instrumentality” to its meaning in legal 
usage:  agency.317  But the degree of non-specification in the idea 
of agency connotes neutral ambivalence—almost ironically, a 
democratic one—that has allowed the word, “instrumentality,” to 
be used in both benign and harmful legal contexts, as noted 
above.  Of course, in legal theory and philosophy, the 
“instrumental” root in “instrumentality” could also connote the 
theory of pragmatic instrumentalism that has considerable 
relevant dominance in American legal discourse.318  This Article 
relies on the suffix, “ity,” in “instrumentality” however, to sustain 
its ambivalence from direct associations with that school of 
thought.  Instrumentality here can be “pragmatic” or not—just 
like law’s instrumentality can be “pragmatic” or not.  But in one 
aspect or another, despite some variance, all of the results of this 
quick etymology in modern legal vernacular points to 
“instrumentality” in law as a quality describing a purposeful 
function in its form.       
Outside of law, the plain-meaning of “instrumentality” 
share some overlapping characteristics to its usage in law, as non-
legal dictionaries continue to denote the word’s agency function; 
however, some dictionaries recognize the word’s function more 
explicitly as a quality and not the thing itself.  As an example, 
Merriam-Webster defines “instrumentality” as “[t]he fact or 
quality of serving as an instrument or means to an end; 
agency.”319  Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) 
registers the meaning in the primary as “[t]he quality or condition 
of being instrumental; the fact or function of serving or being 
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used for the accomplishment of some purpose or end; agency.”320  
Secondarily, the OED defines the word as “[t]hat which serves or 
is employed for some purpose or end; a means, an agency.”  In 
tracing its usage historically, the OED lists discovery of its early 
usage in religious contexts in the fifteenth century, in examples of 
criticizing the agencies of a passive faith and the physical world 
in relation to salvation and the Divine.321  A comparative word, 
“instrumentalness,” has a usage around the same time, also in 
the religious context—also pejoratively describing the failings of 
human nature.322  Its root words—“instrument” and 
“instrumental”—both have varied extensions in history.  The 
OED lists “instrument” being used later, though in a law context 
to describe “a legal document.”323  The word, “instrumental,” had 
its “subservient” use and meanings in the fourteenth century.324  
This earlier use of “instrumental” and the later “instrument” 
suggests that the actual root of the word “instrumentality” might 
be “instrumental” and that its legal connotations was borne out of 
the intervening uses of “instrument” that referred to legal 
documents bearing some agency to accomplish legal effects.       
From close readings of the OED’s identified earliest uses of 
“instrumentality,” one could gather that “instrumentality” was 
used in a much more materialistic and earthly connotation, 
associated with mankind and not with the works and power of 
God.  Indeed, this conclusion could be bolstered by associations of 
the root word, “instrumental,” (rather than “instrument”) with 
the material.325  But, as is presently within the OED, the word, 
“instrumentality,” even despite materiality, has a broad usage 
with an emphasis on the forms and qualities of agency.  Both 
religious and secular examples conveying this observation are 
attached to the word’s primary and secondary meanings; beneath 
the primary meaning in the OED, the word’s qualitative 
connotations of agency have described human religious faith 
(“Physicall instrumentality”), civil government (“instrumentality 
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of men”), and even the handiwork of a particular person 
(“instrumentality of Churchill”).326  Its secondary meaning as 
having an agency for some purposeful end has been used to been 
used to compare the limits of physical nature versus God’s 
omnipotent capabilities (“the subsidiary Instrumentalities of 
Nature”), a type of philosophical agent of faith (“[t]he moral and 
intelligent instrumentality”), illicit human corruption in 
governance (“human instrumentality”), and an active force in 
transforming civilization (“powerful instrumentalities”).327  In 
this way, it seems that the word’s currency is both in its slippage 
to fit different contexts or modify various subjects, and in its 
underlying objective to describe the qualities of purposefulness or 
capabilities of something or someone—even if, as in one of the 
religious examples above, its describes a capability (that of men) 
that is not as useful compared to something else (God or the 
Divine).  Henceforth, as discussed infra, law as “instrumentality” 
relies heavily on this explicit meaning of quality.     
Other associations with the word “instrumentality” are also 
possible. Beyond the legal and theoretical ideas of pragmatic 
instrumentalism, “instrumentality” in the larger vernacular could 
also remotely allude to John Dewey’s political pragmatic theory of 
instrumentalism that “thought exists as an instrument of 
adjustment to the environment.”328  Again, the “instrumental” 
word-root is the culprit.  But likewise here, as in law, the use of 
“instrumentality” rather than “instrumental” here seeks to 
advocate for a similar ambivalence rather than a wholesale 
import of that theory here.  Also, the possible allusion to both 
legal and non-legal philosophies ought to point to the word’s 
slippage.  As we will see below, by emphasizing an umbrella 
usage, the word’s instability likens its use here with some—
though not all—indefinable qualities of the postmodern 
condition.329  It offers an extensive and versatile use—though it is 
ultimately not completely comprehensive or, at least, so 
comprehensive that it swallows its meaning.330  Also what has 
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instrumentality might also be relative to whom or what that 
instrumentality serves.  And lastly the irony for now is that the 
word could quite possibility embody a teleological posture through 
its functions to describe agency or goals—which postmodernism 
tends to reject.331  Facetiously, the metaphysical conceit would be 
“instrumentality”’s inherent “instrumentalism” or 
“instrumentality.”  Later parts of this section will try to reconcile 
both teleological and postmodern perspectives in the 
instrumentality conception.  What is clear here, for now, is that 
“instrumentality” for the purposes of this Article’s premise can 
and ought to embody a certain degree of vagueness.      
The negotiation of this word between its broad definitions 
as a legal term of art and its even more expansive applications in 
the plain language is where this Article seeks to begin using the 
fluid currency of the word for application within the thought of 
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law as instrumentality.  Of course, this quick etymology is not 
exhaustive.  But in this brief explication, the study reveals that 
“instrumentality” is certainly a noun with an inherent strawman 
quality that prompts further inquiry.  Its limits, of course, are not 
endless; indeed, its contours are also fitted within the 
characteristic of agency or facility for the purpose, agency, or ends 
of something else.   
That something else, of course, could be law itself.  
Importing the definition and slippage of the word above, studying 
law as instrumentality could mean learning the law and its 
practices by starting from instability and reaching toward the 
qualities of instrumentality in law first in order to examine and 
seek meaning—looking at moments where the law has 
instrumentality and when the law fails to embody it.  From there, 
these observations of instrumentality lead us to an ontological 
perspective that uncovers a pluralism of possible perspectives of 
what law is: what its purpose is; how it is created and practiced; 
where or in what form is it situated; what reasoning goes into 
that practice; who creates, practices, or benefits from the law; 
what condition is the political system that embody law; what 
theories and histories have shaped its perpetuation in form and 
content; and so on.332  Instrumentality is the tangible pressure 
point that provokes intellectual and practical meanings.  By 
looking at the qualities of a law that purports to have agency in 
fulfilling certain goals, a study based on “law as instrumentality” 
would seek out various types of questions to achieve 
understanding and knowledge.   
In examining the instrumentalities, we can pose 
descriptive questions about the underlying purpose of that law 
and how it is effectuated:  What goals or policies does the law 
accomplish or seeks to accomplish?  And how do the aspects of its 
form and practice do that?  And to what extent are these 
instrumentalities successful?  We can critique philosophically and 
normatively:  Are such goals just or moral?  Are they socially or 
politically efficacious?  Are they political goals?  Are any bigger 
goals?  Should there be other goals that the instrumentalities do 
not fulfill?  Or we can ask questions about the actors (or the 
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Subject(s)) within that instrumentality:  Who accomplishes those 
goals through law as instrumentality?  Whose goals are they?  
Who benefits, directly or indirectly? Who can access that 
instrumentality?  Correspondingly we can ask and study what 
skills are involved in that creating that instrumentality:  How 
does the actor or subject control such instrumentalities to 
accomplish those goals behind a certain law?  Procedurally or 
strategically through a type of reasoning?  How could we do it 
better?  An instrumentality conception, in this way, serves as a 
broad reference point of critique and understanding and learning 
about law; it does not accept goals behind a certain 
instrumentality in law and therefore does not embrace the 
teleology that a certain law seeks to demonstrate.  In fact, an 
instrumentality conception in law ought to use instrumentality to 
discuss the success and failings of such agency and the degrees of 
accomplishments of such goals veiled behind law.  
Though its fixation is partly teleological, this approach to 
law through study of its instrumentality and critique of law’s 
subservience rather than endorsing its teleology offers a 
postmodern alignment with the instrumentality conception.  The 
same questioning from above can and ought to be applied to 
critique and study not merely of law or particular bodies of law, 
but also political systems and institutions that effectuate the law, 
the process of creating law, and conceptualizations of law:  How 
are the instrumentalities of a certain law or a legal regime 
furthering the ends of liberalism?  Neoliberalism?  Morality?  
Distributive justice?  Or just fair deals between private actors?  
Similarly through instrumentality, we can seek out questions in 
regards to a particular legal doctrine:  What instrumentalities 
allow the parol evidence rule to accomplish judicial efficiency?  
Can it be better?  Should we be concerned about judicial efficiency 
when the matter of establishing a meeting of the minds involves a 
tremendous forfeiture for one party?  Or ideas about law:  Does 
pragmatic instrumentalism have any instrumentalities as a way 
of creating and interpreting law?   
Through an ontological observation and critique that bears 
on the law’s descriptive, normative, and practical 
instrumentalities, studying law in this way in spirit results in a 
methodology that can reveal the philosophies, the realities, the 
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practice, the falsehoods, the inefficiencies, the histories, the 
politics, and many other things about the topic of law—without 
having to assume its completeness in the method.  The method 
does not have to be inductive, nor does the Socratic need to be 
wholly abandoned.  They should just be options, among others, at 
the podium.  The law has agency potential and thus has qualities 
that assume instrumentalities, which then reveal other 
characteristics and motivations we place upon the law.  Whether 
law ought to have agency (or not) is a philosophical and 
metaphysical question that can also be part of the lecture hall 
debate for future lawyers as well.  Why should the law embody 
instrumentality?  How do we contribute to that instrumentality?  
This perspective stretches this instrumentality conception as an 
epistemology.  In comparison, although the concept that “law as 
science” does asserts in its content a normative assumption that 
law ought to be scientific, the phrase is more descriptive because 
of the more concrete object of its modifier (science).  Steering our 
inquiry and definition of law toward its instrumentalities and 
away from a presupposed scientific nature makes the inquiry less 
confining and, hopefully, much more resonating in meaning.    
B. The Instrumentality Methodology in Four Steps 
Within this Article’s subtext has been the ontological idea 
that one’s conception of law affects how one objectifies law and 
thusly how one studies it.  In that way, as this subsection will 
show, the instrumentality conception is no different than the 
Langdellian conception in the way that can be translated into a 
methodology.  However, as we will see as well, the 
instrumentality conception’s broader and more neutral 
preoccupations lead to a more encompassing style of gathering 
meaning in law.  Under the instrumentality conception, a 
methodology for investigation of law by its instrumentalities can 
be framed in four sequential steps: (1) establishing instability or 
gaps in law; (2) observing the fragments of law created by the 
instability that exemplify instrumentality; (3) forming meaning 
about law from such instrumentality; and (4) connecting meaning 
with relevance and empowerment.  Using a course on the law of 
contracts as an example hopefully illustrates an application of 
these four sequential steps. 
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First, a first-year contracts course could create a contextual 
instability by beginning without law at all, but rather a societal 
want or need—for instance, the desires for human survival and 
societal advancement.333  The tension here is the supposition that 
without a system (or even a plan), achieving these desires or 
needs might be very difficult or impossible.  The instability is 
further externalized if we notice that in order to advance or even 
survive, resources must be shared between individuals framed 
possibly by a sense of cooperation.334  Agreements are helpful to 
facilitate the cooperative exchange of resources within a 
society.335  But how does a society, in order to advance or even 
survive, make sure that its members are able to agree to 
exchange resources and thus cooperate?  Human nature, after all, 
keeps its limits on altruism.  Hence, a need emerges for a system 
of contract-making to verify that agreements are made and kept, 
and to give recourse when agreements fail.  Now the instability is 
in the qualities of what that system of agreements would look 
like.  Historical examples of contracting can now be brought into 
the course to show students how past societal traditions have 
created these systems by using law.  What specifically does this 
legal system of contracting need to emphasize?  Perhaps a legal 
system of contracting need to recognize trust, good faith, fairness, 
honesty, and clarity as important values in agreement-making.336  
Perhaps such a legal system ought to underscore individual 
freedom to make contracts—as much freedom as the political 
body that houses such a legal system would allow.337  Or perhaps 
                                                 
333 See, e.g., Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN 132-33 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 
MacMillan 1977) (1651); John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True, Original, 
Extent and End of Civil Government: Second Treatise on Government, in 
SOCIAL CONTRACT 3, 10-11 (Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (1690); Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, On the Social Contract, in THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 141 
(Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publ’g 1987) (1762). 
334 Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 Fla. L. 
Rev. 1, 15 (1999) (“Appeal to a social contract can foster the spirit of 
cooperation and compromise.”). 
335 See generally John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
336 See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“ Every 
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement.”). 
337 E.g., Christina Eberl-Borges & Su Yingxia, Freedom of Contract in 
Modern Chinese Legal Practice, 46 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 341, 345 (2014) 
(“[I]n China, freedom of contract is granted--unlike in Western legal systems--
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it should just dictate that individuals must cooperate or suffer 
some societal punishment.  We would need rules of law to further 
the values selected within the various governing ways 
agreements could be made.  Now suddenly the instability seems 
less unstable, and we start to see the instrumentality of law 
arising in the realm of contracts.    
From sociological and anthropological imperatives about 
agreement-making, the course can now move into step two of 
harvesting the specifics of a system of contracting law.  From the 
fragments of what values a contract law system might promote in 
order to sustain and advance a society, students can be made to 
examine specifically what kinds of rules such a system requires 
by looking at the system of contracting that has developed in 
American jurisprudence.  There might be need for rules on how 
parties form agreements, who can form agreements, and what 
happens when formed agreements are then breached.  All of these 
rules ought to, in their own ways, reflect the overarching societal 
goals of human survival and advancement but along the way the 
combination of values of trust, freedom, honesty, good faith, and 
anything else that buttresses the agreement-making process 
must also be reflected.  What students should encounter at this 
stage are the gaps that prompt them to ponder what else do they 
need to know; or prod their curiosities to find out what such rules 
look like in form, and how the law can make happen the 
endorsement of the societal values it serves. 
Step three requires actual engagement with 
instrumentality—here in contract law, that would mean 
encountering the form in which such instrumentality arises 
through reading cases and statutory material, such as the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the (Second) Restatement of 
Contracts, or The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (“CISG”).338  It could also mean 
encountering the content of instrumentality in the rules of 
contract law and seeing for instance, that the rules of contract 
                                                                                                                            
by ordinary law, not by the Constitution. It follows that no special 
constitutional protection applies to freedom of contract in China. This is a 
substantial difference from freedom of contract in the Western sense.”). 
338 E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
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formation in American jurisprudence requires, in part, an 
externalized offer and acceptance process, in which a meeting of 
the minds is approximated.339  The instrumentality of these rules 
might be examined in multiple layers:  How do these rules serve to 
create agreements?  How easily do these rules serve to create and 
facilitate contracts?  What are required and how are they 
externalized by facts, language, and conduct of parties?  How do 
all of these rules combined serve the ends of societal advancement?  
Or in the same realm of contract formation, students can be asked 
to see that the consideration requirement in American 
contracting tradition tries to underscore the value and 
importance of voluntary inducement and freedom of contracting.  
How do the rules for consideration effectual those values?  What 
contours are highlighted in such rules—e.g. bargained-for 
exchange and immediacy—that supposedly reflect such values?  
They might be asked to contrast consideration rules in American 
contracting traditions with the lack of consideration requirement 
in other contracting systems internationally.340        
Here, students can continue their evaluation of the law by 
tying their inquiries here to previous inquiries in step one 
regarding the advancement of societal goals—whether the nature 
of whatever law being discussed fulfills those goals that the 
course acknowledged in step one.  But step three is also the 
moment in the sequence where students begin acquiring 
reasoning skills by reading cases or breaking down complex 
statutory rules and materials.  If the course emphasizes American 
contract law, step three is where students receive training on 
reading cases critically, but also practically; where students learn 
the level of authorities in contract law; where students interpret 
statutory materials and/or contractual documents; where 
students are introduced to factual analysis and making inferences 
to facilitate legal arguments and possibly other skills a professor 
would reasonably ascertain as essential for law students to 
                                                 
339 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note ___,   at § 18. 
340 See, e.g., Amy Lee Rosen, Chinese Contract Formation: The Roles of 
Confucianism, Communism, and International Influences, 20 U. Miami Int’l & 
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acquire in encountering contracts materials.  Thus, step three is 
both knowledge-based and skills-based.   
In teaching with a pedagogy that emphasizes law as 
instrumentality, step four is where hopefully students uncover 
meaning within the law that is relevant and empowering to them.  
For instance, continuing with the lesson on contract formation, 
step four might be where students learn how to use the 
instrumentalities of the rules for formation to argue objectively 
and persuasively on behalf of parties in litigation.  Now we move 
from instrumentality in a knowledge-based inquiry to instruction 
that is strictly more experience-based.  Essentially, the exercise 
illustrates instrumentality or agency in the relevant skills of 
lawyering while it personalizes that engagement of skills.  
Another exercise might draft students into learning how to craft 
contract formation provisions or rules that better effectuate the 
societal goals that ought to be reflected in such rules, but are also 
mindful of how certain parties and entities do business.  
Specifically, this exercise might just involve legislating over one 
rule or statute but it would also allow students to see 
instrumentality in language that effectuates law, or see 
instrumentality in the legislation of laws.  Again, the exercise is 
experiential but the experience seeks to personalize the 
engagement by placing the student as the subject of the law.  Or 
perhaps another exercise here in step four could be transactional:  
How do we as attorneys draft agreements that abide by rules of 
formation and to maintain the best interest of clients?  The 
students can be given a factual scenario involving the negotiation 
of a transaction (a house, an important service, a requirements 
contract over goods, etc.) and some differing parameters for each 
party.  Then they are asked to draft agreements that follow the 
rules of formation, advance the personal goals of each party, and 
maintain the value society places on free exchange of resources 
for advancement.  Here, this example illustrates instrumentality 
within legal documents but also develops drafting skills and 
experience needed for those students who are headed to 
transaction practice.  Hopefully as they gather the knowledge on 
the law’s instrumentalities in the context of formation rules in 
contracts, these exercises allow them to transfer that knowledge 
to create a more meaningful interaction with the law and 
lawyering.  By allowing them to take the meaning they have 
68                       LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY                  [Vol. __ 
  
obtained in their observations about instrumentalities in steps 
one to three and transfer such learning to experiences in step 
four, students understand that they are the subjects of law.  Step 
four reveals both relevance and empowerment—relevance in 
seeing how lawyering requires both knowledge and skills 
regarding the instrumentalities of law and empowerment in the 
active experience in manipulating and controlling those 
instrumentalities in the law classroom laboratory.   
Thus, reaching from instability to the qualities of the 
contract formation law that underscores its instrumentality 
shows students both the qualities and the content of the law on 
contracting behavior in a particular society.  After students’ 
interactivity in acquiring knowledge about the law through such 
qualities in their study of the cases, statutes, and materials, their 
experiences of such knowledge in step four in the lawyering 
process—whether arguing, rule-making, or drafting in the context 
of simulation—creates empowerment for the students for 
engaging in law in the classroom laboratory.  Through 
instrumentality, they become the Subjects that give the Object of 
law its animating life.   
Other law courses can be taught with the instrumentality 
conception.  A good use of the four-step process is in the law of 
remedies, for when essentially laws fail—its instrumentality 
breaks down in remedial relief—and equity must be invoked to 
order to achieve desired goals of justice or redress.  Legal 
remedies are inadequate in certain situations—perhaps money is 
not fast enough or suitable enough to address a nuisance dispute, 
or not sufficient enough to deal with infringement of civil 
rights.341  Or perhaps it is a declaration of some sort that a 
claimant requires, rather than money.342  In this context, the 
fragmentation of law occurs contextually as law’s failing (step 
one).  Within the gaps of that fragment, students must find the 
purpose of remedies and seek out the instrumentality of equitable 
relief (step two).  Equitable relief in its various forms through 
                                                 
341 Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES--EQUITY--RESTITUTION 
86 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the adequacy rule for equity); see also id at 90 
(discussing “constitutional rights” as a category subject to equitable relief). 
342 See id. at 53.  
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case law and statutes demonstrate to students an alternative 
route to redress by governing conduct or allowing a judicial 
proclamation.  Then students must acquire actual knowledge of 
equity and its functions through cases and discussions of how 
equity functions—for instance, learning the types of declaratory 
remedies, injunctive relief, and specific performance orders 
available and learning how to build a case for such devices (step 
three).  Finally, students work through simulations where they 
draft persuasive requests for equitable relief, and in particular 
not overlooking the ability to craft the remedy portion of a 
hypothetical that essentially a court would adopt to enjoin 
another’s conduct (step four).  They can also critique the limits of 
what can be accomplished.  Did the remedy that they drafted 
ultimately accomplish something that was sincerely efficacious or 
just?  Lawyers must know what it is they are reaching for and 
how to do all of these things.  They should also know the 
difference between constructs and limits of jurisprudence.  
Hopefully, by teaching equity through instrumentality, students 
understand the concepts of law and equity and are empowered 
with transfer of that knowledge, not only in litigating toward a 
remedy, but also in crafting and then critiquing a remedy.    
C. Instrumentality in the Curriculum 
Within an instrumentality conception, there might also be 
further benefits in the law school curriculum.  By viewing law as 
instrumentality, an indirect consequence might be the 
democratizing of courses that were once segregated by subject 
matter divisions and given more importance if they were 
doctrinal courses as opposed to interdisciplinary courses or 
contextual ones—such as legal history, race and the law, feminist 
legal theory, law and philosophy, jurisprudence, and the like.  
The hierarchy could erode to elevate the significance of these 
courses that were once considered, according to Duncan Kennedy, 
as part of the “finishing school” of being a lawyer343 or those that 
reflect diversity and plurality in the curriculum if the approach to 
teaching law as instrumentality in doctrinal classes is also 
transferred to these classes by questioning where is the 
instrumentality of law in relation to the subject matter.  In other 
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words, the instrumentality conception is broad enough to apply to 
such courses precisely if such courses are taught in a way that 
makes students see the instrumentality of law within a historical, 
jurisprudential, comparative, theoretical, or otherwise contextual 
narrative.  In this way, the pedagogy works into the relevance of 
courses in upper-level law programming.  Moreover, for courses 
framed within a certain perspective—such as race, gender, or 
sexuality—an instrumentality conception across the curriculum 
would enable the exploration of subjectivity in law without 
perceptions of content marginalization raised by the dominance of 
doctrinal courses that tend objectify law.  By de-emphasizing the 
objectification of law, an instrumentality conception would be 
more conducive to valuing subjectivity in the academy.  This, in 
turn, would bode well for pluralism in law teaching.   
Likewise, as law as instrumentality emphasizes students’ 
capabilities and role in facilitating instrumentality, clinical and 
experiential learning opportunities in law schools would have a 
better co-curricular alignment.  For instance, law schools could 
more thoughtfully program curricular sequences to balance out 
the transfer of learning from traditionally doctrinal courses (such 
as contract law) with associated advanced doctrinal courses (such 
as commercial law or business associations) and/or skills courses 
(such as contracts drafting) in upper-level offerings and finally 
experiences in likeminded clinical courses or externships (such as 
transactional clinics or work in commercial litigation).  The 
empowerment effect in the instrumentality conception might 
create more meaningful experiences for students in those upper-
level experiential opportunities.  The fundamental courses in the 
first year would converse with experiential learning opportunities 
and courses in the second and third years of study.  
 Ultimately, this pedagogy through instrumentality 
responds to students in ways that juxtapose them as the Subjects 
of law by instilling their relevance in the material and facilitating 
their empowerment.  Learning is goal oriented.344  Relevance 
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facilitates learning.345  Law as instrumentality is a more relevant 
pedagogical concept because it responds to reasons why people 
attend law schools: to become lawyers.346  What studying 
instrumentality does is ask the student to explore how the law 
works and what can be accomplished through its creation and its 
practices—what lawyers need to know about the law and its 
application.  Thus, as seen in the examples above, teaching 
through this instrumentality conception can lead to more 
immediate engagement.  In addition, this conception allows for 
teaching and inquiry on the contextual and philosophical 
questions about the law that add to law’s profound 
personalization and meaningfulness for students.  One way to 
encapsulate the trajectory of this method is by positing its 
reverse-engineering approach to the law.  Let us just assume that 
that the law is ultimately unknowable.  But aspects of the law 
that are observable ought to be used for study—its functions, its 
accomplishments, its qualities and characteristics, its authors, its 
degrees of effectiveness for accomplishing goals through practice 
and theorizing, even the failings of its instrumentalities, and the 
teleological assumptions of those instrumentalities.  In practical 
and moral terms, our answers to such questions as posed by all of 
these observations are what the instrumentality conception 
attempts to render in its immediacy.      
V. CONCLUSION 
Rather than self-destructive behaviors akin to rocking the 
boat or jumping ship, this Article has tried to conjure a sense of 
redemption through progress by charting a new direction in the 
philosophy of teaching in American legal education—one that is 
reflective of plurality and hopefully enlivens thoughtful, critical, 
and energizing debates in the academy for the rescue and 
salvation of American legal education.  As introduced in these 
pages, the instrumentality conception directs us away from the 
objectification of law by not embracing the aesthetic preferences 
of the Langdellian formalists but looking more ontologically in the 
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belief that the instrumentalities of law can lead to the 
acknowledgment of subjectivity and eventually, meaning and 
understanding.  The only objectification of law that occurs in the 
instrumentality conception does so in larger relation to the 
Subject of the law because the conception allows us to 
acknowledge our study more transparently when the act of 
inquiry involves acknowledging our own sifting through of the 
fragments of law in order to draw relevant meaning that 
emboldens our capabilities to advance law and also to critique 
that advancement.  A perspective from instrumentality, thus, 
tames the law for its Subject—for our students, and ultimately for 
us, as we all bring law to life.  Henceforth, this conception allows 
us to transfer the meaning of law back to an instrumentality 
within our control.   
To be sure, the former conception of law as science and its 
reflected pedagogy in the case method has had its place in the 
study of law and training of lawyers, and ought to have a 
presence in the future, as it would have within an 
instrumentality conception—just like case law has its continuing 
importance in our legal system.  But it would become only one 
kind of method, amongst a variety of methods in the same way 
that case law is only one kind of law.  Thus, the dominance of the 
case method should be lessened to make way for other methods 
and realities of law; and it would be lessened within the 
instrumentality conception.  
Ultimately, the conception, as methodology, seeks to reveal 
law’s relevance and use its demonstrative experiences to empower 
individuals.  Lawyers have agency, and thus transitively, they 
personify the instrumentality of law as well.347  Accordingly, 
future legal inquiries through instrumentality will lead to 
questioning how lawyers contribute or embody agency.  This hope 
at the heart of that conception’s directive is to reveal the human 
in law in order to better educate lawyers.  American law schools 
and legal education also possess agency and instrumentality. Our 
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current and future students will become the stewards and 
captains of legal knowledge, thought, and practice long after the 
current cries of crisis have passed.  The instrumentality 
conception would imbue them with knowledge and technique 
relevant to their present and future stations in the law and 
engages them to find meaning and power inwardly so that they do 
not just learn to think like lawyers but also to transform.  This 
vast and noble possibility in the lecture halls of law schools is 
ultimately the instrumentality that the academy must embody in 




                  
           
